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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to empirical analysis of the differentials, dynamics and 
determinants of labour market performance in EU-15. One innovation of the paper reflects our 
decision not to use a single indicator of labour market performance, but to adopt three variables: 
employment rate, unemployment rate, and long-term unemployment rate. In addition to national data 
(1997-2006), the use of data at regional NUTS-2 level (1999-2005) is a key characteristic of this study. 
Empirical analyses are carried out by means of various comparative statistics and econometric 
approaches. In the latter, a large set of explicative variables is applied to examine the potential 
determinants of regional (un)employment levels and dynamics. 
JEL Classification: R23, P50, J21, J23  
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1. Introduction 
  The aim of this paper is to contribute to empirical analysis of the differentials, 
dynamics and determinants of labour market performance across EU-15 in recent 
years. The topic is particularly attractive due to: (i) the existence (and, partly, 
persistence) of remarkable national and regional differentials
1, but also (ii) the 
unexpected shift from a long period of prevailing “job-less growth” and diverging 
employment performance to a situation of prevailing “job-rich (low-) growth” and 
general convergence in EU-15 labour market performance
2. 
  In the first part of the paper we briefly review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the determinants of labour market performance and differentials 
(section 2), discuss labour market performance indicators (section 3.1) and place 
(un)employment evolutions in a more general framework of real dynamics (section 
3.2). 
  The second part of the paper (section 4) first provides a descriptive analysis 
of differentials, changes and convergence trends in national/regional labour market 
performance indicators and in employment intensity of growth, by means of basic 
descriptive and non-parametric techniques. Then, with both cross-section and panel 
                                                 
∗ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the IX EACES Conference (Brighton, UK, 
September 8-10, 2006) and at the XV AISSEC Conference (Naples, November 24-25, 2006). The 
authors would like to thank Will Bartlett, Floro Ernesto Caroleo, Gianluigi Coppola, Enrico Marelli 
and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply. 
Contacts: perugini@unipg.it and signorel@unipg.it 
1 Analyses of the regional dimensions of the European labour market have been recently presented in 
Caroleo and Destefanis (2006). In particular, Amendola et al. (2006) used a dynamic multivariate 
approach in order to investigate the existence and persistence of regional disparities in Europe. 
2 On the employment intensity of growth see, e.g., Dopke (2001); European Commission (2002); 
Kapsos (2005). On the dynamics of labour market participation in a global perspective, see Kapsos 
(2007). 210 
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data econometric analyses, the existence of significant relationships is tested between 
the main regional labour market performance indicators and four groups of 
explicative factors: (i) development/growth indicators and sectoral structure, (ii) 
labour costs, (iii) institutional settings, and (iv) other variables. 
2. A partial review of literature on (un)employment determinants: 
Okun’s law, labour cost and institutional variables  
  As is well-known, an extremely large range of theoretical and empirical 
literature has analysed the determinants of labour market differentials and 
performance (both levels and dynamics). As it is impossible to examine all the main 
studies, we recall here only part of the literature, considered more strictly functional 
to the aims of this paper. We start from the main results based on the so-called 
Okun’s law, highlighting its limitations which are (mainly) due to neglecting the 
importance of prices (labour costs and wages) and institutional factors as 
determinants of labour market performance. 
  Although the link between labour market performance and per capita GDP 
level has also been considered
3, the existing literature has devoted particular attention 
to relationships between employment/unemployment changes and GDP dynamics. 
Some preliminary questions are related to the definition of the (main) direction of 
causality: (i) is it per capita GDP growth (e.g., above a certain threshold) which 
increases employment (or reduces unemployment)? Or (ii) is it employment growth 
(or reduction in unemployment) which increases GDP? Or (iii) do both per capita 
GDP and (un)employment changes depend, mainly or exclusively, on many other 
variables, so that a simple and direct causal relationship cannot be said to exist? 
Theoretical discussion of the causal links between output and unemployment (or 
employment) has always been particularly important in the history of economic 
research
4. Considering the aims of this paper, we present only a brief review 
regarding the last three decades. Okun (1970) defined a coefficient corresponding to 
the rate of change of real output associated with a given change of the 
unemployment rate, focusing on an estimation of “potential” GDP. So, in that 
seminal paper, unemployment was seen as the exogenous variable and real GDP as 
the dependent variable. In much empirical research estimating the Okun coefficient, 
causality is mostly assumed to be in the opposite direction, i.e., changes in output 
explain variations in employment or unemployment. Prachowny (1993) considered 
the theoretical foundation of Okun’s law and derived empirical evidence for the US, 
supporting the view that the Okun equation is a useful proxy in macroeconomics. 
Erber (1994) estimated the Okun equation for a number of OECD countries, finding 
a significant negative correlation between unemployment and growth. Padalino and 
Vivarelli (1997) found that the Okun equation is still valid in G-7 countries and that 
the growth-employment link in manufacturing is stronger than for the total 
economy. Blinder (1997) counted the relation between unemployment and growth 
among the principles of macroeconomics in which “we should all believe”, but he 
also argued that a simple equation between the percentage change of output and the 
                                                 
3 A higher per capita GDP is generally accompanied by higher female participation and employment 
rates, and by lower under-employment in the agricultural sector. 
4 Rodano (2004) carried out an analysis of the labour market in the history of economic thought, 
focusing on some of the above questions.  
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absolute change in unemployment rates is “atheoretical, if not indeed 
antitheoretical”. Baker and Schmitt (1999) estimated the Okun coefficient for a panel 
of OECD countries and found that (i) employment intensity of growth was higher in 
the 1990s than in previous periods, and (ii) foreign growth is a crucial variable for 
domestic employment dynamics. Lee (2000) estimated the Okun equation for all 
OECD countries, and stressed that the relationship is not stable over time and that it 
is different across countries, but concluded that the impact of growth on 
employment is still valid
5. Solow (2000) argued that a good deal of European 
unemployment is due to lack of demand: he used the Okun equation and quantified 
the output gap for Germany. Gabrisch (2005) applied Okun’s law to test the 
unemployment-output relationship in the eight countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe which joined EU in 2004, but found a systematic relationship only in the 
later stages of transition.  
  Considering the regional perspective, Freeman (2000) found the high stability 
of Okun's coefficient for all time periods and across US regions, whereas Villaverde 
and Maza (2007) found that an inverse relationship between unemployment and 
output holds for most of Spanish regions in the period 1980-2004, but the Okun's 
coefficients are quite different across regions (partly as a consequence of regional 
disparities in productivity)
6. Lastly, Aoki and Yoshikawa (2006) added a “regional” 
labour sector to a model of output fluctuations and found that Okun's coefficient 
increases as the average GDP increases.  
  Notwithstanding the varying results, all the above studies suggest that the link 
between (un)employment and growth is still a useful macroeconomic “rule of 
thumb”. 
  Flaig and Rottman (2000) criticised the Okun coefficient literature because it 
neglects the influence of relative prices. Indeed, they argue that the employment 
intensity of growth is clearly related to real labour cost; consequently, estimating a 
simple Okun equation is not appropriate, due to incorrect specification. Obviously, 
the structure and evolution of labour costs and wages are important features of the 
labour market and, through their link with productivity, profits and consumption, 
they are also important determinants of economic growth and (un)employment 
performance. A broad literature has considered wage moderation (and its 
determinants) as a crucial condition for avoiding poor labour market performance. 
However, as is well-known, Keynes clearly warned about the macroeconomic risks 
(and difficulties) of wage reductions, partly due to the effect on consumption 
decisions. In the last few decades, many researchers have focused on nominal and 
real wage rigidities as determinants of unemployment. Studies on wage-setting 
institutions and labour market performances have greatly increased in recent years. 
For example, the OECD Job Strategy recommends policies aimed at increasing wage 
flexibility, including shifts towards decentralised wage bargaining (OECD, 1994, 
1995, 2005a). In a long-run perspective of structural change, Vercelli and Signorelli 
(1994) considered the wage and occupational instability as part of a general heuristic 
model of the forms of instability and regulations.  
                                                 
5 Lee (2000) also used several methods to calculate the output elasticity of employment or 
unemployment. 
6 On the empirical analyses of regional GDP and employment dynamics and convergence, see also 
Perugini and Signorelli (2005b) and Perugini et al. (2005). 212 
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  In a regional perspective, Montuenga et al. (2006) investigated the wage curve 
and measurement of wage flexibility in five EU countries, while Sudekum (2006) 
used some stylised facts of EU-15 regions to present a theoretical model combining a 
wage curve with increasing returns technology.  
  Revenga and Bentolila (1995) explained that different employment intensity 
of growth may depend partly on differences in labour market institutions
7. In many 
studies, institutions have been analysed not only for their effects on wage levels, 
differentials and dynamics, but also for their direct effects on labour market 
performance. Part of the literature considers each institutional factor (e.g., OECD, 
1994, 1995; Scarpetta, 1996) as “independent variables”, part considers possible “sets 
of institutional characteristics” defining different “industrial relations systems” (e.g., 
Calmfors and Driffil, 1988; Soskice, 1990a; Buti et al., 1998; Signorelli, 2000)
8. Genda 
et al. (2001) analysed the huge difference in labour market performance between 
Japan and Italy and attributed a key role to the degree of uncertainty faced by firms 
when making employment decisions, and, in particular, the uncertainty generated by 
the industrial relations systems. Some authors use the concept of “neocorporatism”, 
with some differences in definition (e.g., Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, p. 24). 
However, in short, the main indicators used to determine the degree of 
“neocorporatism” are the level of centralisation of wage negotiations and the degree 
of bargaining coordination. Some empirical research has found a positive relationship 
between a country’s economic performance and its degree of “neocorporatism” (e.g., 
Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Crouch, 1985; Tarantelli, 1986; Soskice, 1990b). These 
authors argue that a more “neocorporatist” industrial relations system can internalise 
the main macroeconomic effects of any agreement, allowing better economic 
performance. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) found a non-monotonic (U-shaped) 
relationship between the degree of centralised bargaining and economic 
performance. Decentralised bargaining is constrained by competition in the product 
market; in centralised negotiations, trade unions and employers internalise most of 
the negative externalities of wage increases. So, the authors argue that countries with 
an intermediate type of collective wage bargaining are in the worst situation: interest 
groups are strong enough to impose their conditions on wage negotiations, but are 
not sufficiently encompassing to consider the social costs of their actions. It is 
interesting to highlight that the crucial condition for good performance on the part 
of decentralised systems is the absence of monopolistic (or oligopolistic) firms 
which, facing a not infinitely elastic demand curve, may, at least partly, pass wage 
increases on to their customers by increasing product prices
9. There are also many 
difficulties in the classification of the various countries according to the industrial 
                                                 
7 In a more general framework, Blanchard (2000a, p. 1403) argued that "identifying the role of differences in 
institutions in generating differences in macroeconomic short and medium-run evolutions is likely to be an important 
topic of research in the future." 
8 Assessments of the impact of various industrial relations systems on measures of economic (and 
employment) performance are very difficult, because of measurement and methodological problems 
(e.g., Signorelli, 2000; Pieroni and Signorelli, 2002). The method usually adopted in empirical 
analysis is that of correlating rankings of the various countries according to economic performance 
indicators and indicators of the level of neocorporatism and/or centralisation of industrial relations. 
The main factors considered in the literature as indicators of economic performance are the 
following: 1) real GNP growth rate; 2) inflation rate; 3) unemployment rate; 4) misery index 
(inflation rate + unemployment rate); 5) productivity growth. 
9 For the crucial importance of a high degree of competition in the product market, see Nickell (1999).  
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relations systems. For example, Soskice (1990b) claims that Japan and Switzerland 
were wrongly classified as decentralised systems by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), who 
neglected to consider the role of powerfully co-ordinated industrial (employer) 
organisations and networks in those countries. If they were re-classified, Soskice 
showed that unemployment would be a monotonic decreasing function of the degree 
of “neocorporatism”. Other significant difficulties for analysis are the questions of 
determining the primary direction of causality, possible existence of feedbacks, 
possible strong dependence of outcomes on the period considered, and the 
(in)stability of relationships
10. Many other institutional factors, in addition to 
centralisation and co-ordination of wage bargaining, have been considered in the 
literature. Some of them
11 are the fiscal wedge, employment protection legislation 
(EPL), active labour market policies (ALMP), passive labour market policies (PLMP), 
working time and part-time regulation, and product market regulation. In particular, a 
number of empirical studies have found that high labour taxes tend to increase 
unemployment rates (e.g., Belot and van Ours, 2000; Nickell, 1997; Daveri and 
Tabellini, 2000); other authors are less conclusive (e.g., Scarpetta, 1996; Nunziata, 
2003). Strict EPL means higher costs of firing workers, which entails disincentives to 
hiring in the first place, with reductions in both inflows and outflows from 
unemployment and ambiguous effects on the unemployment rate. The OECD 
(2005a) claimed that the depressing effect of EPL on employment was stronger than 
the effect on aggregate unemployment; Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov et al. (1998) 
found a positive effect in some estimated equations, but Nickell (1997) and Nunziata 
(2003) found no significant effect. Signorelli (1990 and 1997) highlighted the joint 
role and interactions of “systemic uncertainty” and “systemic flexibility” (of which 
labour market flexibility is a part) and their effects on regular and irregular labour 
demand. According to Blanchard (2005), shocks and institutions (and their 
interactions) have played a key role in determining the generally bad labour market 
performance in Europe in the last thirty years. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) 
emphasised that, contrary to the predictions of most economic theory, labour market 
reforms increasing flexibility “at the margin” (i.e., increasing the flexibility for 
temporary and training contracts), have recently been paying out in terms of 
employment growth; in particular, they argue that these two-tier labour market 
reforms have a transitional, “honeymoon”, job-creating effect, which has so far been 
largely ignored by the literature. Corsini and Guerrazzi (2007) provide a probabilistic 
evaluation of the transition from temporary to permanent employment in a regional 
context, and found a stabilisation probability of 61.6%, but with significant variations 
across worker characteristics. Perugini and Signorelli (2004) highlighted the fact that 
the 12 European countries which adopted a single currency (January 1999, 2001 for 
Greece), notwithstanding the restrictive macro-economic policies required to respect 
the financial convergence goals defined by the Maastricht Treaty criteria (1992) and 
confirmed in the “Stability and Growth Pact” (1997), have (like the EU-15 
aggregation) been characterised by unexpected improvements in (national) 
                                                 
10 For example, Calmfors (1993) analysed some of these difficulties and produced more prudent and 
less general conclusions compared with Calmfors and Driffill (1988). 
11 See, for a brief survey, Employment in Europe 2003 and OECD (2005a). For the complex 
relationship between employment protection legislation and labour market performance, see 
OECD, 2004, chapter 2. For the various models of European labour market regulation, see 
Signorelli (2006). 214 
 
EJCE, vol. 4, n. 2 (2007) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
employment performance (1997-2003) and by σ- and β-convergence trends on both 
national (1997-2003) and regional (1999-2003) levels. They argued that a positive link 
between the (surprising) employment performance and the role played by the 
European Employment Strategy cannot be excluded. As regards more specific labour 
policies, properly designed ALMP can reduce unemployment by improving efficiency 
in the job-matching process, but some empirical results are ambiguous or negative 
(Martin, 2000; Layard et al., 1991; Nickell, 1997; Scarpetta, 1996; Morgan and 
Mourougane, 2001). Relatively high unemployment benefits (passive labour market 
policies) which are available for relatively long durations can have negative effects on 
(un)employment performance, especially by reducing the job search intensity of the 
unemployed and their willingness to accept job offers. More flexible working time 
arrangements and the spread of part-time work can favour both labour demand and 
supply increases, with stronger effects on employment with respect to 
unemployment. There is also evidence of interactions between labour market 
institutions and product market regulation (Nickell, 1999; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 
2002; OECD, 2005a and 2005b). In addition, product market deregulation (reducing 
rents) may pave the way for subsequent labour market reforms (Duval and 
Elmeskov, 2005). Recently, some authors (e.g., Amable et al., 2006) noted that the 
coefficient of the interaction term (between product market regulation and EPL) is 
negative, implying that complementarities exist between the two forms of regulation.  
  As for researches dealing with sub-national aspects and data, Bollino and 
Signorelli (2003) considered the institutions as a particular and complex factor of 
production affecting regional production structures and employment performances, 
and Monastiriotis (2006) presented a set of labour market flexibility indicators at sub-
national level. Lastly, Caroleo and Coppola (2005) confirmed the importance of 
institutional variables (especially, centralisation of wage bargaining, decentralisation 
of public expenditure, and the level of bureaucracy) to explain EU regional 
unemployment disparities.  
3. Labour market performance indicators and real convergence 
  In this section, we first discuss our decision to consider three labour market 
performance indicators and then briefly present an analysis of (un)employment 
changes in a more general framework of real dynamics and convergence.  
3. 1 Labour market performance variables 
  A key characteristic of this paper is the use of three indicators of labour 
market performance. In order to support our decision, we provide a brief review and 
a theoretical discussion about the use of unemployment and employment variables. 
  As emphasised by Roncaglia (2004) and Rodano (2004) using an “historical” 
perspective, for various reasons most of the economic literature considers 
unemployment indicators as the main proxies of labour market performance. 
Although for classical economists such as Smith, the focus was on employment 
(“productive labour”) - since the wealth of nations crucially depends on both labour 
productivity and the share of productive workers with respect to the total population 
- subsequent theoretical evolution led to a clearcut tendency towards the use of 
unemployment rates. Keynes introduced the notion of (involuntary) unemployment, 
mainly in order to highlight the fact that “effective demand” may be insufficient to  
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guarantee full employment. The principle of effective demand allows equilibrium 
income and, consequently, the equilibrium level of employment, to be determined. In 
this context, unemployment and unemployment rates play a (mainly) passive role and 
are the consequence of the equilibrium level of income and employment when the 
(exogenous) labour force is taken into account. Unemployment and unemployment 
rate became  “crucial” in all economic theories focusing on the gap between labour 
supply and demand - from pre-Keynesian marginalism (e.g., Pigou) to Keynesian 
neoclassical synthesis and “new Keynesian” approaches, from the monetarist school 
to rational expectation (market clearing) theories. Obviously, the various economists 
and schools attributed different roles and definitions to the concept of 
unemployment: involuntary, short-term or long-term, structural, frictional, natural 
(natural unemployment rate in the most neoclassical approach and NAIRU - Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment – or NAWRU, Non-Accelerating 
Wage Rate of Unemployment - in the neo-Keynesian perspective), voluntary and 
wait unemployment, and so on. Naturally, very different (economic and labour) 
policy implications derive from the various concepts of unemployment. In addition, 
if we consider the existence of significant labour market segmentation and the 
relevance of local labour markets, the role attributed to the aggregate unemployment 
rate(s) in affecting wage bargaining and dynamics and the tendency towards labour 
market equilibrium are markedly reduced. 
  In the growth and development theories, i.e., in a long-term perspective, the 
focus is mainly on the quantity (and, more recently, the quality) of “labour as a 
factor of production, growth and development”, but with a generally over-simple 
definition of the role played by the levels and dynamics of the (working-age) 
population, labour force, employment and employment rates. 
  As highlighted by Roncaglia (2004), the unemployment rate is a useful 
indicator of particularly low labour market performance (and an index of changes in 
the contractual weight of employees and unions)
12 but, due to the difficulties in 
correctly defining “full employment”, its exclusive use is questionable and the 
employment rate should be introduced as a complementary indicator. The 
usefulness of also considering employment dynamics was already emphasised in past 
decades (e.g., Valli, 1970), but many authors have recently started to prefer 
employment indicators (e.g., Frey, 1994; Signorelli, 1997; Moro, 1998; Garibaldi and 
Mauro, 2002; Tronti, 2002; Marelli, 2004; Perugini and Signorelli, 2004). Other 
economists (e.g., Blanchard, 2000b p. 324) are aware of the limitations of the 
unemployment rate as an indicator of labour market performance and attribute 
some merit to employment (or non-employment) rate indicators; but they are not 
fully convinced of the opportunity of using both (or of preferring the latter). 
In our opinion, employment indicators are preferable to (or should be at 
least placed beside) unemployment indicators, for the following reasons: (i) there are 
well-known difficulties and differences in the statistical definition and subjective 
perception of the unemployment condition, especially regarding “active search for a 
job”; (ii) the unemployment rate also depends on the participation rate (labour 
                                                 
12 In addition, the information supplied by long-term unemployment (and the long-term 
unemployment rate) remains crucial in assessing labour market performance, since it is an indicator 
of the degree of persistence of part of the labour supply in unemployment status. 216 
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supply), which in turn partly depends on employment rate (job opportunities)
13, i.e., 
a discouragement effect may exist; (iii) considering the importance of the fiscal 
wedge on labour (social contributions and labour income tax), employment rates are 
also preferable indicators of the sustainability of national welfare systems
14; (iv) the 
Lisbon European Council (March 2000) defined total and female employment rates 
(calculated on a working-age population aged 15-64) as the crucial objective variables 
that needed to be improved; (v) the (quantitative) employment rate indicators 
(different from the unemployment rate) may usefully be integrated with some 
qualitative and quantitative information, such as type of contract (permanent and 
temporary employment rate, part-time employment rate), work quality (related to 
general working conditions and characteristics) and the influence of the so-called 
“working poor” (share of total employed population earning a wage under a certain 
minimum level).  
Obviously, the employment rate (calculated on the working-age population) 
also has some problems, related to: (i) various (annual, weekly, daily) working hours 
(e.g., due to different weight of part-time employment), which produce significant 
differences between “employment” (number of workers) and “labour volume” (e.g., 
standard labour units or total hours annually worked)
15, (ii) the weight and changes 
in the “shadow economy” and “irregular employment” (in terms of both persons 
involved and total hours worked)
16,  and (iii) the exclusion of “non-market labour 
activities” (e.g., unpaid household work and unpaid voluntary activities) from the 
official employment records. Moreover, the ER also depends on the dynamics of the 
working-age population, which may create paradoxes, e.g., a reduction in working-
age population with stable employment (or employment decreasing at a lower per 
cent rate) produces an increase in employment rate, whereas an increase in working-
age population accompanied by a lower per cent increase in employment reduces it. 
The above limitations may be removed to some extent by considering, in addition, 
changes in employment rate with respect to total population and the employment 
dynamic. 
We now briefly consider the formal relationship between employment and 
unemployment rates, in order to show how the use of the UR alone can lead to 
paradoxical pitfalls in evaluating labour market performance.  
The employment rate may be defined as the complement to one of the 
unemployment rate (divided by 100) multiplied by the participation rate: 
PR
UR
P
LF
LF
U LF
P
E
ER × ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ − =
×
× ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ −
=
×
=
− − 100
1
100 100
64 15 64 15
          [1] 
where LF is the Labour force (= employment (E) + unemployment (U)); UR is the 
Unemployment rate (= unemployment x 100 / labour force); ER is the 
Employment rate (= employment x 100 / population 15-64); and PR is the 
Participation rate (= labour force x 100 / population 15-64). 
                                                 
13 In particular, international and regional comparisons (e.g., Perugini and Signorelli, 2004 and 2005a) 
show that similar unemployment rates are compatible with significant differences in employment 
rates. 
14 More broadly, employment rate level and change may also be considered as two minor indicators of 
the sustainability of public finance dynamics. 
15 An additional indicator is the ratio between total annual hours worked and the working-age 
population. 
16 The existence of the shadow economy also affects the reliability of the unemployment rate.  
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  In a simple dynamic perspective, it is easy to show that the change in 
employment rate is compatible with different dynamics of unemployment rate, 
participation rate, employment, and working-age population.  
  Starting from equation 1, the unemployment rate may be defined as the 
complement to one of the ratio between employment rate and participation rate (the 
result multiplied by 100): 
        100 1 × ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ − =
PR
ER
UR             [2] 
  In a simple dynamic perspective, it is easy to show that a reduction in 
unemployment rate is necessarily accompanied by a per cent increase in the 
employment rate higher than the per cent increase in the participation rate, i.e., the 
increase in employment is greater than the increase in the labour force. Obviously, a 
reduction in unemployment rate is also compatible with a reduction in employment 
(or per cent ER) if the latter is lower, in absolute terms, than the reduction in labour 
force (or per cent PR). 
Following some of the above considerations, in this paper we use the 
employment rate in addition to the traditional labour market performance indicator 
(unemployment rate). We also consider the long-term unemployment rate (calculated 
on labour force), since a high unemployment rate may be the result of high flows in 
and out of unemployment, and/or a high average duration of unemployment. 
Obviously, for the same level of unemployment rate, a higher short-term 
unemployment rate (less than one year) (STUR) is preferable. 
     STUR UR LTUR − =      [3]   
3. 2 A wider approach to real dynamics and convergence  
In this section, we briefly discuss labour market performance changes in a 
more general framework of real dynamics and convergence.  
Per capita GDP (level and dynamic) may be decomposed into the basic 
components of productivity (GDP/E), employment rate (ER=E x 100/ P15-64) and a 
demographic indicator (P15-64/P), in both static and dynamic frameworks.  
 
100
1 64 15 × × × = × =
−
P
P
ER
E
GDP
P
E
E
GDP
P
GDP    [4] 
Thus, in dynamic terms, per capita GDP changes and 
convergence/divergence trends are the result of dynamics and 
convergence/divergence of labour productivity, employment rate, and the share of 
working age population on total population. 
In turn, labour productivity may be decomposed into hourly productivity 
(GDP/H) and the average working time per employed person (H/E). 
 
100
1 64 15 × × × × =
−
P
P
ER
E
H
H
GDP
P
GDP
    [5] 
As regards the real convergence, although the idea of per capita GDP and 
productivity beta convergence is well rooted in economic theory starting from 
Solow's contribution (1956), and a lively debate on the topic is still one of the core 
issues of development and regional economics, the transfer of this conceptual 
framework to labour market dynamics is not simple, and one should be aware that 218 
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GDP growth and employment/unemployment dynamics may differ remarkably. As 
clearly explained, among others, by Blanchard (2000b) this may be due to: (i) the 
various possible responses of labour demand to output growth (or decline) (e.g., the 
labour hoarding phenomenon); (ii) the possible combinations of demographic and 
labour force dynamics in response to (or independent of) output fluctuations. In 
addition, the dynamics of productivity may also alter the relationship between output 
and employment (or unemployment). This view is clearly supported by some 
empirical results for EU countries, in which a long period of prevailing job-less 
growth and divergent labour market performance dynamics (Bean, 1994; Padalino 
and Vivarelli, 1997; Solow, 2000; Baici and Samek Lodovici, 2001; Garibaldi and 
Mauro, 2002; Sapir, 2004; Blanchard, 2005; Perugini and Signorelli, 2004 and 2005b; 
Marelli, 2000 and 2007) have recently been followed by a job-rich (low-)growth and 
prevailing convergence dynamics in EU-15 labour market performance (see Section 
4.2 in this paper, but also Perugini and Signorelli, 2004, 2005b; Marelli, 2007
17). 
However, the derivation of an independent theory of employment/unemployment 
beta convergence has not been attempted, and is clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper
18.  
Partially different considerations may be made with reference to a theoretical 
background for sigma convergence of labour market performance. Although the 
crucial problem of the definition of a common long-term convergence point persists, 
in a purely marginalistic framework, the idea of a process of harmonisation of labour 
market performance and equilibrium states is clearly justified. If indeed the labour 
market is in every aspect identical to all the other ones
19, factors of production are 
perfectly mobile (at both inter-regional and inter-industry levels), and the price 
(wage) adjustment mechanism is left fully free to do its job, every unbalance in a 
labour market (e.g., excess of labour supply – that is, unemployment) should result in 
an adequate, rapid wage dynamic; and the hypothesised perfect integration of all 
labour markets should guarantee a single wage rate, clearing all markets (and thus 
permitting the absence of any involuntary unemployment). Of course, this purely 
                                                 
17 In a long-term perspective, Marelli (2007) distinguishes three "models" of growth in European 
countries: (i) an intensive model, with large productivity gains, even at the expense of employment; 
(ii) an extensive model, with significant improvements in employment, despite moderate (or even 
negative) growth rates and thus to the detriment of productivity; (iii) a virtuous model, characterised 
by a significant increase in employment, but even larger value added (and productivity) gains. 
18 In this direction, a preliminary condition would be the definition and acceptance of a concept, 
corresponding to the “steady state” in growth theory, of a common long-term labour market 
equilibrium. This concept is of course abundantly available in the literature (see the so-called 
“natural rate of unemployment” in its many versions), but its validity may be challenged from many 
perspectives. Following Solow (1990), we reject the restrictive hypotheses of the existence of a 
single long-term unemployment rate in favour of the more realistic possibility of a range of values 
that unemployment (and employment) rates may assume, across countries/regions and also in the 
long term, according to the effects of multiple economic, social and institutional factors and 
policies. We argue that the above hypotheses on the existence of a range of "equilibrium" 
(un)employment rates (according to countries/regions and over time) allows us to analyse the 
dynamics of labour market performance, rejecting the strict hypotheses of convergence to a single 
"natural equilibrium", but without excluding the possibility of a more general convergence process. 
In addition, our investigation of the possible dependence of empirical results on the labour market 
performance indicators used (unemployment versus employment rates) is consistent with the above 
"heterodox" approach. 
19 As an example of the heroism of this assumption, note that, as reported by Rodano (2004), Walras 
too would disagree on this point.  
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theoretical reasoning cannot be simply shifted in terms of “employment” 
performance, due to the fact that, as shown earlier, the same unemployment rate 
would be compatible with several employment rates, due to labour force 
participation (labour supply) dynamics.  
In any case, in our opinion, the use of (un)employment sigma and beta 
converge analysis should be considered a useful descriptive tool, functional in (i) 
considering the contribution of labour market performance to the traditional real 
convergence dynamics of development levels, and (ii) comparing the per capita 
GDP, productivity and ER dynamics and convergence between different areas (as in 
Section 4.3, Figure 1) and (iii) assessing the process of convergence towards EU 
policy objectives. 
From the first point of view, as emphasised by Esteban (2000), the 
inconclusiveness of convergence/divergence theory and empirics in a growth 
environment may be attributed to the fact that per capita income levels and changes 
depend on the interaction of various economic, productive, demographic and 
structural factors which unfold over time. The importance of accounting for these 
aspects was clearly put forward by Boldrin and Canova (2001, p. 217), who stress 
how the gap between the various convergence/divergence theories (predicting labour 
productivity dynamics) and empirical tests (which broadly adopt per capita incomes) 
is simply bridged by assuming full employment, neglecting the roles played by labour 
market performance dynamics. In particular, for the EU regions, Boldrin and Canova 
(2001) consider convergence patterns for per capita GDP as a whole and for labour 
productivity and unemployment rates separately. Similar considerations about the 
role of labour market performance on per capita GDP dynamics are also provided, 
for example, by Azzoni and Silvera-Neito (2005), Cuadrado-Roura et al. (2000), 
Ezcurra et al. (2005), Camagni and Cappellin (1985), Perugini and Bracalente (2006) 
and Marelli (2007). More in general, all the literature concerned with the 
decomposition of per capita GDP into its various components (both statically and 
dynamically), often using a shift-share approach, may be directly linked to this 
point
20. This provides, in our opinion, the first strong argument on the usefulness of 
explicitly applying convergence analysis to labour market performance, especially in 
those contexts - as in many European regions - where development delays may be 
more a matter of employment than of productivity lags and where, consequently, 
productivity growth rates may be accompanied by different (un)employment 
dynamics, producing complex patterns of per capita GDP convergence processes. 
As already noted, the convergence approach to labour market performance is 
also related to a more policy-making framework, with specific bearing on the EU. 
The well-known EU cohesion objectives (via the reduction of development 
disparities) also depend on re-balancing the outstanding gaps of regional labour 
market performance, and this is clearly incorporated in the so-called European 
Employment Strategy (EES). As is well-known, the EES was launched during the 
1997 Luxembourg Job Summit as an “open method of coordination”, and one of its 
most important novelties was the definition of three quantitative objectives at the 
2000 Lisbon Council (which also integrated the EES into the so-called Lisbon 
Strategy) and the 2001 Stockholm Council. The targets are based on the following 
                                                 
20 For the most famous examples, see Dunn (1960), Duro and Esteban (1998), Esteban (2000), 
Kamarianakis and Le Gallo (2003), Dall’Erba et al. (2005), Ezcurra et al. (2005) and Benito and 
Ezcurra (2005).  220 
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indicators: (1) total employment rate, ER (=employment x 100/P15-64) of 70% by 
2010; (2) female ER (=female employment x 100/female P15-64) higher than 60% by 
2010; and (3) older worker employment rate (= employed persons from 55 to 64 
years old x 100/P55-64) exceeding 50% by 2010. So the EU policy targets clearly 
envisage a convergence pattern, within a given point in time, of labour market 
performance towards specific targets.  
In short, the above considerations provide motivations for the study (of 
sigma and beta convergence) and comparison of evidence (US vs. EU-15) presented 
in sections 4.2 and 4.3. In addition, they may serve as a starting point for future 
research efforts.  
4. Compared empirical evidence and econometric analyses  
In this section, we first present compared empirical evidence at both national and 
regional levels, and then produce various econometric estimates of the determinants 
of regional labour market performance differentials and dynamics. In particular, the 
econometric analyses of section 4.4 are preceded by a data description (section 4.1), 
descriptive analyses (section 4.2) and a brief empirical discussion of the relationship 
between (un)employment and GDP growth (section 4.3). 
4. 1 Data 
The labour market and economic data used here are entirely drawn from the 
on-line Eurostat dataset and refer to the 15 countries (and their NUTS 2 level 
regions) of the European Union before the 2004 enlargement
21. Only data on GDP 
(at 1995 constant prices, transformed into purchasing power parity) and population 
are from Cambridge Econometrics Ltd. 
In our empirical analyses, coverage of the datasets changes according to the 
availability of the statistical information needed. The descriptive statistics of section 
4.2 are limited to the three basic labour market indicators, i.e., employment rate (ER), 
unemployment rate (UR) and long-term unemployment rate (LTUR), observed over 
the decade 1997-2006 for the 15 EU countries
22 and over the period 1999-2005 for 
their NUTS 2 regions
23. Some regions have many missing values and were therefore 
excluded
24; some other missing data for other regions were estimated by linear 
interpolation using, where possible, information from the NUTS 1 level. This first 
regional dataset is composed of 203 regions. As regards the regional analysis 
presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4, the set of regions considered had to be further 
                                                 
21 The availability of the data of interest (at regional level) partly constrains analysis, especially in terms 
of duration. The still ongoing process of transition to a market economy and its consequences on 
labour market dynamics led us to exclude the new EU members of Central and Eastern Europe 
from the analysis. Their inclusion would also have implied a further narrowing of the time-span of 
the dataset.  
22 As for the national level, although a longer period was available, we decided to consider the decade 
following the launch of the European Employment Strategy. 
23 GDP data for 2005 at regional level are forecasts from Cambridge Econometrics. 
24 These are: fi20 – Åland (Finland); fr91 – Guadeloupe, fr92 – Martinique, fr93 – Guyane, fr94 - 
Réunion (France); es63 - Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta, es64 - Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla (Spain); 
pt20 - Região Autónoma dos Açores, pt30 Região Autónoma da Madeira (Portugal). The other 
insular Spanish region of Canarias (es70) was also excluded, in view of the problems arising with 
“remote” observations when spatial econometric tools are used (see sections 4.3 and 4.4).   
 
Cristiano Perugini and Marcello Signorelli, Labour Market Performance in EU-15 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
221
reduced, due to lack of data referring to institutional features. This second dataset is 
thus composed of 187 regions of the EU-15 countries (excluding Ireland, Greece 
and Luxembourg) observed over a seven-year period (1999-2005)
25. A list of the 
regions considered in the various analyses is reported in table A3 of the appendix, 
while a short description of all the indicators used can be found in table A4. 
4. 2 Compared evidence and descriptive analyses 
We limit descriptive analysis here to three labour market performance indicators 
(ER, UR, LTUR) at both national and regional levels, assumed as possible endogenous 
variables in the following econometric testing. We provide some basic compared 
evidence; descriptive diagrams (box plots and k-density estimations
26) of the shape of the 
distributions and their evolution; diagrams plotting convergence/divergence patterns of 
sigma (trend of coefficient of variation) and beta (Lowess density estimation
27) type; 
transition matrixes (only for regional level) showing the probability of a region of 
moving, over the period considered, to the next or previous quintiles of the distribution.  
When assessed in terms of ER, the country-level labour market performance in 
EU-15, notwithstanding a reduced output growth rate, revealed a widespread and 
unexpected improvement in the decade 1997-2006. In particular, the very good 
performance of Spain, Ireland, Italy, Finland and Greece are to be emphasised (Table 1). 
The increase in ER especially regarded female and elderly employment (Table A1 and A2 
in Appendix). The general labour market performance improvements reduced the 
significant gap of the EU-15 (average) countries with the performances of the US and 
Japan. It should be noted that some EU countries (Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Sweden, UK) present similar or better performances compared with the US and Japan. 
During the decade 1997-2006, the EU-15 countries experienced a surprising and 
generalised increase in employment (in the 15-64 age group) of 12.5%, more than 18 
million new jobs - double with respect to the increase in the 15-64 population (table 2). 
In particular, the employment change was especially remarkable in Spain (+47.9%) and 
Ireland (+45.5%). 
That considerable net job creation was completely due to increases in the 
number of employees, especially with permanent contracts (more than two-thirds of the 
total employment increase). Employees with temporary contracts increased by around 
5.8 million. Half of the total net job creation (more than 9 million workers) was due to 
the increase in the spread of part-time employment.  
 
                                                 
25 The 13 Greek regions were excluded due to lack of data on levels of Bargaining Centralisation and 
Coordination; Luxembourg was excluded due to lack of data on Bargaining Centralisation, 
Employment Protection Legislation, Product Market Regulation and Active Labour Market Policies 
expenditures. For the two Irish regions, the adopted labour cost indicator was not available. 
26 The plots obtained by a Kernel density (K-density) estimation (Silverman, 1986) are density 
distributions considered as the continuous equivalents of histograms, in which the number of 
intervals tends towards infinity. The point on the curve associated with any level of the variable 
may be interpreted as the likelihood a unit of the distribution has in assuming that level of the 
variable. 
27 Lowess (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) estimation is a non-parametric technique for 
estimating the relationship between two variables (in our case, between growth and the initial values 
of the indicator). In the empirical literature, the technique has gained remarkable importance, since 
it is able (compared with parametric estimates) to reveal graphically the existence of complex beta 
convergence/divergence relationships (e.g., club convergence). 222 
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Table 1. Employment rate (ER) levels and dynamics 
∆ 1997-20061 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
p. p.  % 
EU-15  60.7 61.4 62.5 63.4 64.0 64.2 64.3 64.7 65.2 66.0  +5.3 +8,7
EMU-12  58.4 59.2 60.4 61.5 62.2 62.4 62.6 63.0 63.5 64.5  +6.1  +10,4
Belgium  56.8 57.4 59.3 60.5 59.9 59.9 59.6 60.3 61.1 61.0  +4.2 +7,4
Denmark  74.9 75.1 76.0 76.3 76.2 75.9 75.1 75.7 75.9 77.4  +2.5 +3,3
Germany  63.7 63.9 65.2 65.6 65.8 65.4 65.0 65.0 65.4 67.2  +3.5 +5,5
Ireland  57.6 60.6 63.3 65.2 65.8 65.5 65.5 66.3 67.6 68.6  +11.0  +19,1
Greece  55.1 56.0 55.9 56.5 56.3 57.5 58.7 59.4 60.1 61.0  +5.9  +10,7
Spain  49.5 51.3 53.8 56.3 57.8 58.5 59.8 61.1 63.3 64.8  +15.3  +30,9
France  59.6 60.2 60.9 62.1 62.8 63.0 63.3 63.1 63.1 63.0  +3.4 +5,7
Italy  51.3 51.9 52.7 53.7 54.8 55.5 56.1 57.6 57.6 58.4  +7.1  +13,8
Luxembourg  59.9 60.5 61.7 62.7 63.1 63.4 62.2 62.5 63.6 63.6  +3.7 +6,2
Netherlands 68.5 70.2 71.7 72.9 74.1 74.4 73.6 73.1 73.2 74.3  +5.8 +8,5
Austria  67.8 67.9 68.6 68.5 68.5 68.7 68.9 67.8 68.6 70.2  +2.4 +3,5
Portugal  65.7 66.8 67.4 68.4 69.0 68.8 68.1 67.8 67.5 67.9  +2.2 +3,3
Finland  63.3 64.6 66.4 67.2 68.1 68.1 67.7 67.6 68.4 69.3  +6.0 +9,5
Sweden  69.5 70.3 71.7 73.0 74.0 73.6 72.9 72.1 72.5 73.1  +3.6 +5,2
U.  K.  69.9 70.5 71.0 71.2 71.4 71.3 71.5 71.6 71.7 71.5  +1.6 +2,3
Coeff. of var.  0.118  0.113  0.109  0.103 0.101 0.096 0.090 0.082 0.079 0.081   
U.  S.  73.5 73.8 73.9 74.1 73.1 71.9 71.2 71.2 71.5 n.a. -2.0  -2.7%
Japan  70.0 69.5 68.9 68.9 68.8 68.2 68.4 68.7 69.3 n.a. -0.7  -1.0%
Note: (1)  ∆ 1997-2005 for US and Japan.  Source: Eurostat (online database). 
 
Table 2.  15-64 Employment and population changes (1997-2006; absolute value and %)  
  ∆ 1997-2006 
Employment 
% ∆ 1997-2006 
Employment 
∆ 1997-2006 
Population 
∆ 1997-2006 Employees 
      Total1       Temporary1 
∆ 1997-2006 
Part time2 
EU-15 +18,704,500  +12,5  +9,165,500 +18,527,200 +5,787,200 +9,133,000
EMU-12 +16,858,300  +14,4  +7,769,100 +16,732,100 +5,853,100 +8,528,500
Belgium +425,700  +11,2  +238,500 +441,600 +115,100 +370,500
Denmark +129,100  +4,9  +58,100 +118,300 -43,600  +48,800
Germany +1629,900  +4,7 -411,000 +1295,400 +1,079,600  +3,308,900
Ireland3 +624,600  +45,5  +535,600 +608,500 -44,800 -85,900
Greece +611,800  +16,3  +366,300 +718,600 +72,500 +79,700
Spain +6,349,000  +47,9  +3,478,800 +6,069,400 +2,118,000 +1,255,000
France +2,674,400  +12,2  +2,385,100 +2,848,900 +454,100 +571,300
Italy +2,781,400  +14,0  +30,900 +2,560,900 +1,080,200 +1,587,100
Luxembourg +26,900  +16,0  +26,600 +26,700 +7,600 +19,700
Netherlands +904,000  +12,5 +411,900 +882,800 +458,700 +1,050,900
Austria +270,100  +7,5  +212,000 +285,600 +64,700  +305,700
Portugal +303,800  +6,7  +410,200 +663,600 +407,100  +51,400
Finland +256,400  +11,9  +84,100 +330,000 +40,200 +93,100
Sweden +421,600  +10,7  +303,400 +476,900 +260,200 +125,300
U. K.  +1,295,700  +4,9  +1,035,000 +1,199,900 -282,600 +430,300
Note: (1) Total and Temporary contracts for employees may be par- time or full-time; (2) part-time employment 
may be (i) permanent or temporary contracts for employees and (ii) self-employment; (3) Ireland 1997-
2005 (2006 data not available). 
Source: Eurostat (on line database). 
 
As highlighted in table 3, the significant cross-countries differential in total 
ER are also reflected in huge differences in “employees ER”, “temporary ER” and  
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“part-time ER”. The three indicators, calculated on the 15-64 population, range (i) 
from 39.3 in Greece to 70.7 in Denmark, as for “employees ER”, (ii) from 1.9 in 
Ireland to 18.2 in Spain, as for “temporary ER”, (iii) from 2.7 in Ireland to 34.0 in 
Netherlands, as for “part-time ER”. 
 
Table 3.  ER (1997 and 2006) distance to Lisbon objective levels and (2006) 15-64 ER composition 
  (1997) 2006 ER  
distance to EU goal1 
2006 
ER 
2006 
Employees ER
2006 
Temporary ER2
2006 
Part time ER3 
EU-15 (-9.3)  -4.0  66.0  56.0  8.2  13.2 
EMU-12 (-11.6)  -5.5  64.5  54.3  9.0  12.2 
Belgium (-11.6)  -9.0  61.0  52.1 4.5 13.4 
Denmark (+4.9)  +7.4  77.4  70.7  6.3  17.7 
Germany (-6.3)  -2.8  67.2  59.8 8.7  17.0 
Ireland4 (-12.4)  -1.4  68.6  58.0 1.9 2.7 
Greece (-14.9)  -9.0  61.0  39.3  4.2 3.3 
Spain (-20.5)  -5.2  64.8  53.4  18.2  7.7 
France (-10.4)  -7.0  63.0  56.0  7.5  10.8 
Italy (-18.7)  -11.6 58.4 43.5  5.7  7.6 
Luxembourg (-10.1)  -6.4  63.6  58.6  3.6  10.9 
Netherlands (-1.5)  +4.3  74.3  65.3  10.7  34.0 
Austria (-2.2)  +0.2  70.2  61.2  5.5  14.9 
Portugal (-4.3)  -2.1  67.9  54.2  11.2 5.5 
Finland (-6.7)  -0.7  69.3  60.8  9.9  9.3 
Sweden (-0.5)  +3.1  73.1  65.8  11.2  17.3 
U. K.  (-0.1) +1.5  71.5  62.3  3.5  17.5 
Note: (1) 70% (as defined by Lisbon Council in 2000); (2) Temporary ER = 15-64 temporary employees x 100 / 
15-64 population. Temporary contracts for employees may be part-time or full-time; (3) Part-time ER = 
15-64 part-time employment x 100 / 15-64 population. Part-time may be (i) permanent or temporary 
contracts for employees and (ii) self-employment; (4) Ireland 1997-2005 (2006 data not available). 
Source: Eurostat (on line database) and our elaboration on Eurostat data. 
 
A positive correlation exists between total ER and part-time ER, whereas the opposite 
occurred with the weight of the “shadow economy” (Figures A2 and A1 in Appendix).  
The parts of diagrams 1 and 2 referring to ER supply complementary information about 
the shape and evolution of its distribution. As highlighted by the box plots, the large variability of the 
distribution in 1997 (ranging from 49.5 in Spain to 74.9 in Denmark) partly declined in 2006 
(ranging from 58.4 in Italy to 77.4 in Denmark). This sigma convergence trend of national ER is 
also highlighted by the descending trend of the coefficient of variation (table 1 and diagram 2a). 
Similarly, a clear beta-type convergence pattern also emerges (diagram 2.b), revealing a catching-up 
process by countries with the lowest performance in 1997, which underwent greater improvements 
towards the main quantitative objective of the European Employment Strategy. 
  The compared evidence on unemployment rates (table 4 and related diagrams) shows a 
partially different picture. In three out of 15 countries, the UR increased during the period, while the 
improvements of Spain, Ireland, Finland and Italy were considerable. In terms of overall distribution 
dynamics (diagram 1 – box plots; diagrams 2a and 2c), the trend is not very different from that 
observed for ER. However, while beta convergence patterns clearly emerged, sigma convergence 
only started in 2000. Compared with ER, the remarkable differences (a) in the level of variability of 
the distribution (the UR coefficient of variation is approximately 3 times that of ER) and (b) in the 
clearcut bimodality of the distribution of UR (diagram 1), should in any case be noted, since they 
highlight the persisting polarisation of two “clubs” of UR performers.  224 
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Table 4. Harmonized unemployment rate (UR) levels and dynamics 
∆ 1997-2006   
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
p. p.  % 
EU-15  9.8 9.2 8.5 7.6 7.2 7.5 7.9 8.0 7.9 7.4 -2.4  -24.5
EMU-12  10.5  10.0  9.1 8.2 7.8 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.9 -2.6  -24.8
Belgium  9.2 9.3 8.5 6.9 6.6 7.5 8.2 8.4 8.4 8.2 -1.0  -10.9
Denmark  5.2 4.9 5.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.9 -1.3  -25.0
Germany  9.1 8.8 7.9 7.2 7.4 8.2 9.0 9.5 9.5 8.4 -0.7 -7.7
Ireland  9.9 7.5 5.7 4.2 4.0 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.4 -5.5  -55.6
Greece  9.8  10.8 12.0 11.2 10.7 10.3 9.7 10.5 9.8  8.9 -0.9 -9.2
Spain  16.7 15.0 12.5 11.1 10.3 11.1 11.1 10.6  9.2  8.5  -8.2 -49.1
France  11.5 11.1 10.5  9.1  8.4  8.7  9.5 9.6 9.7 9.5 -2.0  -17.4
Italy  11.3 11.3 10.9 10.1  9.1  8.6  8.4 8.0 7.7 6.8 -4.5  -39.8
Luxembourg  2.7 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.7 3.7 5.1 4.5 4.7  +2.0  +74.1
Netherlands  4.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.8 3.7 4.6 4.7 3.9 -1.0  -20.4
Austria  4.4 4.5 3.9 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 4.8  +0.4  +9.1
Portugal  6.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 4.0 5.0 6.3 6.7 7.6 7.7  +0.9  +13.2
Finland  12.7 11.4 10.2  9.8  9.1  9.1 9.0 8.8 8.4 7.7 -5.0  -39.4
Sweden  9.9 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.9 4.9 5.6 6.3 7.4 7.1 -2.8  -28.3
U.  K.  6.8 6.1 5.9 5.3 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.8 5.3 -1.5  -22.1
Coeff. of var.  0.419  0.435  0.449  0.474 0.471 0.419 0.358 0.317 0.300 0.294   
U.  S.  4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.8 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 -0.3 -6.1
Japan  3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.1  +0.7  +20.6
Source: Eurostat (online database). 
 
Table 5. Harmonized long-term unemployment rate (LTUR) levels and dynamics 
∆ 1997-20061    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
p. p.  % 
EU-15  4.8 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 -1.7 -35.4
EMU-12  5.4 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.6 -1.8 -33.3
Belgium  5.4 5.6 4.8 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.2 -1.2 -22.2
Denmark  1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.8 -0.7 -46.7
Germany  4.6 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.5 5.4 5.0 4.7  +0.1 +2.2
Ireland  5.6 3.9 2.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 -4.2 -75.0
Greece  5.3 5.8 6.5 6.1 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.1 4.8 -0.5  -9.4
Spain  8.7 7.5 5.7 4.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.4 2.2 1.9 -6.8 -78.2
France  4.7 4.5 4.1 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 -0.7 -14.9
Italy  7.3 6.8 6.7 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.9 4.0 3.9 3.4 -3.9 -53.4
Luxembourg  0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4  +0.5  55.6
Netherlands  2.3 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.7 -0.6 -26.1
Austria  1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3  0.0  0.0
Portugal  3.2 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.9 3.7 3.8  +0.6  +18.8
Finland  4.9 4.1 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 1.9 -3.0 -61.2
Sweden  3.1 2.6 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 -2.0 -64.5
U.  K.  2.5 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 -1.3 -52.0
Coeff. of var.  0.549  0.591  0.655  0.711 0.725 0.685 0.633 0.595 0.576 0.579   
U.  S.  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 n.a.  +0.2  +50.0
Japan  0.7 0.8  1  1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 n.a.  +0.8  +114.3
Note: (1) LTUR = long-term unemployment x 100 / labour force 
  (2) ∆ 1997-2005 for US and Japan 
Source: Eurostat (online database). 
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As for LTUR, remarkably good performance by Spain, Ireland, Italy and Finland 
emerged inside a generally positive framework. LTUR had a much higher level of 
dispersion compared with UR and, especially, ER. A sigma convergence trend has 
emerged since 2001 (table 5 and diagram 2a), whereas beta convergence was clearcut 
during the period (diagram 2c). The bimodality of the distribution of LTUR is more 
evident when compared with UR (diagram 1). 
 
Diagram 1. Box plots (1997-2006) and k-density estimates (2006) of basic labour market indicators in 
EU-15 countries     
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Diagram 2. Sigma and beta (non-parametric) convergence dynamics of labour market 
performance indicators in EU-15 countries (1997 - 2006)      
2.a. Sigma convergence (coefficient of variation) 
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Source: our elaborations on Eurostat data (online database). 
  Moving on now to regional level descriptive analysis, a first observation 
regards the median performance over the period considered, which is positive for ER 
but shows a U-shape for unemployment indicators (table 6, diagram 3). 
Table 6. Summary statistics for labour market performance indicators of EU-15 regions 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ER 
Mean  63.1 64.2 64.7 64.8 65.1 65.1 65.8 
Median  63.5 64.5 64.8 64.9 65.4 65.5 66.4 
Minimum  38.7 37.8 40.7 41.9 42.0 43.4 44.1 
Maximum  79.0 80.1 79.2 79.0 78.1 78.2 78.0 
Coeff. of variation  0.125  0.122 0.119 0.115 0.109 0.103 0.100 
UR 
Mean  9.1 8.1 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.1 
Median  7.5 6.5 6.0 6.4 6.8 7.2 7.3 
Minimum  2.4 2.1 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.6 
Maximum  28.0 26.0 25.7 24.6 23.4 23.4 22.3 
Coeff. of variation  0.575  0.623 0.631 0.589 0.560 0.527 0.510 
LTUR 
Mean  4.1 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 
Median  3.2 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Minimum  0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Maximum  18.4 17.7 17.4 15.5 15.1 15.0 13.7 
Coeff. of variation  0.810  0.891 0.985 0.972 0.925 0.875 0.866 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat data (online database).  
 
Cristiano Perugini and Marcello Signorelli, Labour Market Performance in EU-15 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
227
The extent of the distribution of ER in 1999 ranges from 38.7 (itf6 – 
Calabria, Italy) to 79.0 (ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire, UK) and falls in 2005 
(from 44.1 of itg1 – Sicily, Italy, to 78.0 of ukj1 Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire, 
UK). The decreasing trend in the variability of the distribution shows sigma 
convergence (diagram 3), as also witnessed by the increased probability of falling in 
the modal value of the k-density distribution (diagram 4). This process is clearly 
accompanied by very widespread growth of regional ER, corresponding to a clearcut 
forward movement of the distribution. The relatively stronger ER growth over the 
period of the worst performers in 1999 produces a marked beta convergence trend. 
 
Diagram 3. Box plots and sigma convergence of basic labour market indicators in EU-15 regions 
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Complementary information can be drawn from the transition probability 
matrix of table 7. The distribution of ER (and subsequently of UR and LTUR) are 
divided into five quintiles, and row reading of the matrix highlights the probability of 
a region persisting in the same quintile of distribution (along the diagonal) or moving 
to the next or previous one. For example, a region falling in the first quintile of the 
ER distribution in 1999 had probabilities of 83% of persisting in the same relative 
position and of 17% of moving to the next one during the seven years considered. 
As regards the second quintile in 1999, the probability of moving to a higher class 
was more than three times that of going down to the first quintile. Similarly, the 
probability of a region in the third quintile in 1999 of going forward was more than 228 
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double that of going backwards. It is also interesting to note how persistence 
probability increases as position in the initial distribution increases. 
 
Table 7. Transition matrixes: probability of moving to another quintile for the EU-15 regions (1999-2005) 
 
ER 
  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  82.8  16.8  0.4 0.0 0.0  100.0 
2  6.2 74.0  19.8 0.0  0.0  100.0 
3  0.0  6.8 77.3  15.9 0.0  100.0 
4  0.0 0.0 6.9  78.1  15.1  100.0 
5  0.0 0.0 0.0 9.2  90.8  100.0 
Total  18.8 19.5 21.1 20.1 20.5  100.0 
 
UR 
  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1  85.0  15.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 
2  16.5 61.9 20.8  0.9  0.0 100.0 
3  0.5  22.5 57.7 19.4  0.0 100.0 
4  0.5  2.4 19.1  72.3 5.7  100.0 
5  0.0 0.0 0.4  14.1  85.5  100.0 
Total  22.6 20.1 19.2 19.8 18.3  100.0 
 
LTUR 
  1 2 3 4 5  Total 
1 84.2  15.3  0.5 0.0 0.0  100.0 
2  23.5 62.4 13.7  0.4  0.0 100.0 
3  0.0  21.8 57.6 20.5  0.0 100.0 
4  0.0  3.6 27.1  61.3 8.0  100.0 
5  0.0 0.0 0.0  10.0  90.0  100.0 
Total  21.5 21.0 20.1 18.7 18.7  100.0 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat data (online database). 
 
  A slightly different picture of EU-15 regional labour markets emerges when 
the UR and LTUR indicators are considered. As already noted, the mean and median 
trends first decreased and then, after 2001, increased. That year also saw the 
inversion of sigma divergence trends of the distribution (diagram 3). The indicators, 
again with variability levels four (UR) and seven (LTUR) times that of ER, confirm 
the outstanding disparity of labour market performance in EU-15. The UR 
distribution ranges from 2.4% in lu-00, Luxembourg
28 to 28% in itf6 – Calabria 
(Italy) in 1999, and from 2.6% in ukg1 - Herefordshire, Worcestershire and 
Warwickshire (UK) to 22.3 in dee2 – Halle (Germany) seven years later. As regards 
LTUR, the best and worst performers in 1999 were respectively the Italian itd1 - 
Provincia Autonoma Bolzano-Bozen and itf6 – Calabria. Seven years later, the lowest 
level was observed in ukg1 - Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire (UK) 
and the highest in dee1 – Dessau (Germany). 
                                                 
28 Apart from the specific case of Luxembourg, other regions present similarly very low 
unemployment rates: in particular, itd1 - Provincia Autonoma Bolzano-Bozen (I), with 33; Tyrol 
(AU) and pt16 - Centro (PT ) reveal a 2.5% unemployment rate.  
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  The shapes of the distributions shown in diagram 4 do not highlight a general 
improvement like that described by the ER forward shift of the distribution, whereas 
the increased probability of falling in the modal class confirms an albeit weak sigma 
convergence trend, also marked by the reduced extent of the probability distribution. 
As regards Lowess estimates, a beta-convergence pattern takes place in terms of UR, 
whereas a sigma convergence has emerged since 2001. 
 
Diagram 4. K-density estimates (1999 and 2005) and lowess beta-convergence trends (1999-2005) of basic 
labour market indicators in EU-15 regions  
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The differences in the behaviour of ER versus UR and LTUR distributions are even 
more marked when the transition probability matrixes are examined (note that, for 
the two unemployment indicators, moving to the upper quintile is to the detriment 
of the relative labour market performance). One first feature to be noted is a kind of 
higher (compared with ER) probability of moving to another relative position, as 
shown by widespread lower persistence probabilities and the non-zero likelihood of 
moving to another non-contiguous class. For example, a region falling in the fourth 
quartile of the UR distribution had a 6% probability of falling in the worst class in 
2004, but also probabilities of 19% of entering the third quintile, 2.5 % of entering 
the second quintile, and even 0.5% of reaching the first-class club. Similar 
observations may be made for LTUR where, however, the probability of a region 
worsening its relative position increased compared with UR. 
4. 3 Employment (and unemployment) changes and GDP growth rates 
Europe (EU-15) is usually instanced as having a worse labour market 
performance compared with the US. With decomposition [5], we graphically present 
(figure 1) the compared changes which occurred in the period 1970-2000 in these 
two economic areas (all variables are expressed as percentages of US values). The 
following relative (compared) real dynamics and convergence processes emerged: (i) 
per capita GDP convergence between the two areas was very weak, and the 
European per capita GDP remained around 70% that of the US; (ii) remarkable 
changes occurred in labour productivity (measured as GDP/hours worked): 
productivity in EU-15 increased from 65% to more than 90% of US levels; (iii) at the 
same time, average working hours per employed person (initially similar between 
EU-15 and US) underwent a significant relative drop in EU-15, of up to 85% of US 
levels; (iv) a remarkable relative change occurred in the employment rate: starting 
from a situation of slightly better performance in EU-15 in 1970 (employment rate 
3.6% higher), in 2000 the EU-15 reached an employment rate of 87.6% of the US 
level (as a result of prevailing job-less growth in EU-15 and significant net job 
creation in the US economy). 
Figure 1 – Compared real dynamics and convergence: US (=100) and EU-15 (1970 and 2000) 
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Source: our elaborations on Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO) based on ESA 95 national accounts. 
Legend:   GDP/P = GDP/population = per capita GDP. 
GDP/H = GDP/hours worked = labour productivity. 
H/E = hours worked/employment = annual average in working hour per employed person. 
ER = employment x 100/working age population (15-64) = employment rate 
WAP/P = working age population (15-64)/population.  
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In order to analyse the more recent years (1997-2006) in EU-15 countries, let us now 
examine some evidence about the direct relationship between GDP growth and labour market 
indicators and (un)employment aggregates. This is done at country level by computing the 
correlation coefficient between annual GDP and employment growth rates in the decade (table 8); 
running a pooled bivariate regression of the annual employment growth versus annual GDP 
growth (table 9); and calculating the elasticity of employment to growth (table 10). As regards 
regional levels, we use here very simple bivariate regressions (tables 11 and 12) between growth rates 
of real GDP and (i) employment/unemployment level growth, and (ii) ER, UR and LTUR 
dynamics. 
 
Table 8. Annual GDP growth rates and % employment changes 
      1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006  corr. 
GDP  2.6 2.9 3.0 3.8 1.9 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.6  2.8  0.860  EU-15 
Empl.  1.0 1.7 1.9 2.2 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.8  1.3  (0.001) 
GDP  2.6 2.8 3.0 3.8 1.9 0.9 0.8 2.0 1.5  2.7  0.870  EMU-12 
Empl.  0.9 1.9 2.0 2.4 1.5 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.8  1.4  (0.001) 
GDP  3.5 1.7 3.4 3.7 0.8 1.5 1.0 3.0 1.1  3.2  0.275  Belgium 
Empl.  0.5 1.6 1.3 2.0 1.4 -0.1 0.0 0.6 1.0  0.9  (0.441) 
GDP  3.2 2.2 2.6 3.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 2.1 3.1  3.2  0.631  Denmark  Empl.  1.2 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.8 -0.1 -1.3 0.0 0.7  1.8  (0.051) 
GDP  1.8 2.0 2.0 3.2 1.2 0.0 -0.2 1.2 0.9  2.8 0.874  Germany 
Empl.  -0.1 1.2 1.4 1.9 0.4 -0.6 -0.9 0.4 -0.1  0.7  (0.001) 
GDP  11.7 8.5 10.7 9.4  5.8  6.0 4.3 4.3 5.5  6.0  0.673  Ireland  Empl.  5.6 8.6 6.2 4.6 3.0 1.8 2.0 3.1 4.6  4.2  (0.033) 
GDP  3.6 3.4 3.4 4.5 5.1 3.8 4.8 4.7 3.7  4.3  0.162  Greece 
Empl.  -0.5 2.9 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.5 3.4 0.9  1.4  (0.654) 
GDP  3.9 4.5 4.7 5.0 3.6 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5  3.9  0.928  Spain  Empl.  3.6 4.5 4.6 5.1 3.2 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.8  3.3  (0.000) 
GDP  2.2 3.5 3.3 3.9 1.9 1.0 1.1 2.5 1.7  2.0  0.722  France 
Empl.  0.4 1.5 2.0 2.7 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.5  0.8  (0.018) 
GDP  1.9 1.4 1.9 3.6 1.8 0.3 0.0 1.2 0.1  1.9  0.319  Italy  Empl.  0.3 1.0 1.1 1.9 2.2 1.6 1.5 0.4 0.3  1.7  (0.369) 
GDP  5.9 6.5 8.4 8.4 2.5 3.8 1.3 3.6 4.0  6.2  0.588  Luxemb. 
Empl.  3.1 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.6 2.9 1.8 2.3 3.0  3.7  (0.074) 
GDP  4.3 3.9 4.7 3.9 1.9 0.1 0.3 2.0 1.5  2.9  0.823  Netherl.  Empl.  3.3 4.1 3.9 3.1 2.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.9 0.0  1.2  (0.004) 
GDP  1.8 3.6 3.3 3.4 0.8 0.9 1.1 2.4 2.0  3.1  0.761  Austria 
Empl.  0.9 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5  1.4  (0.011) 
GDP  4.2 4.8 3.9 3.9 2.0 0.8 -0.7 1.3 0.5  1.3 0.925  Portugal  Empl.  n.a. n.a. 1.9  1.7  1.6  0.5  -0.4  0.1  0.0 0.6  (0.001) 
GDP  6.1 5.2 3.9 5.0 2.6 1.6 1.8 3.7 2.9  5.5  0.704  Finland 
Empl.  3.3 2.0 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.4  1.4  (0.023) 
GDP  2.3 3.7 4.5 4.3 1.1 2.0 1.7 4.1 2.9  4.2  0.392  Sweden  Empl.  -1.3 1.6 2.1 2.4 1.9 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.4  1.8  (0.262) 
GDP  3.0 3.3 3.0 3.8 2.4 2.1 2.7 3.3 1.9  2.8  0.436  U. K. 
Empl.  1.8 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9  0.8  (0.208) 
 
GDP  4.5 4.2 4.4 3.7 0.8 1.6 2.5 3.9 3.2  3.3  0.928  U.S. 
Empl.  2.3 2.1 1.9 2.0 -0.7 -0.3 0.9 1.1 1.7  1.9  (0.001) 
Source: Eurostat online database and our elaborations. 
Note: p-values of correlation coefficients in brackets.  232 
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  For each of the EU-15 countries, table 8 shows the annual GDP growth 
rates, the corresponding percentage increase in employment, and their levels of 
correlation. For some countries the positive relationship is high and significant 
(especially Spain and Portugal), whereas in many others the correlation coefficient is 
low and/or not significant. However, the generally low and declining growth rates in 
the decade (Ireland is the well-known exception) were not accompanied by 
significant deterioration in employment (as always happened in other periods of low 
growth, like the early 1980s and early 1990s) and an unexpected job-rich (low-growth 
period) emerged. 
When the data of table 8 is used to run a pooled bivariate regression of 
annual employment growth versus annual GDP growth for the EU-15 countries, we 
obtain the outcomes shown in table 9. The relationship is positive and significant 
and, according to the size of the coefficient, an annual GDP growth of 1% would be 
accompanied by a 0.6% increase in employment. 
 
Table 9. Pooled bivariate regressions between GDP and employment growth (1997-2006) in EU-15  
148 observation*  % Empl. growth  
 coefficient  p-values 
% GDP growth  0.598  0.000 
constant -0.249  0.136 
Adjusted R2 0.544   
Data on employment growth in Portugal for 1997 and 1998 are missing 
 
Lastly, we provide a simple calculation of the index of employment 
elasticity to growth over the period 1997-2006 (table 10). The index is very unstable 
across years and countries. The elasticity data generally confirm how the slowing 
down of growth rates in the most recent years was accompanied, in several cases, by 
unexpected employment growth. 
 
Table 10. Employment elasticity with respect to GDP in EU-15 countries 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-15 0.38  0.59  0.63  0.58  0.74 0.64 0.45 0.30 0.50 0.46 
EMU-12 0.35  0.68  0.67  0.63  0.79 0.78 0.50 0.35 0.53 0.52 
Belgium 0.14  0.94  0.38  0.54  1.75  -0.07 0.00 0.20 0.91 0.28 
Denmark 0.38  0.68  0.38  0.11  1.14 -0.20 -3.25 0.00  0.23  0.56 
Germany -0.06  0.60  0.70  0.59  0.33 n.a. 4.50 0.33  -0.11  0.25 
Ireland 0.48  1.01  0.58  0.49  0.52 0.30 0.47 0.72 0.84 0.70 
Greece -0.14  0.85  0.09  0.11  0.06 0.05 0.31 0.72 0.24 0.33 
Spain 0.92  1.00  0.98  1.02  0.89 0.89 1.03 1.09 1.09 0.85 
France 0.18  0.43  0.61  0.69  0.95 0.60 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.40 
Italy 0.16  0.71  0.58  0.53  1.22 5.33  n.a.  0.33 3.00 0.89 
Luxembourg 0.53  0.69  0.60  0.65 2.24 0.76 1.38 0.64 0.75 0.60 
Netherlands 0.77  1.05  0.83  0.79  1.37 5.00 -1.67  -0.45 0.00 0.41 
Austria 0.50  0.36  0.48  0.29  0.75  -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.45 
Portugal n.a.  n.a.  0.49  0.44 0.80 0.63 0.57 0.08 0.00 0.46 
Finland 0.54  0.38  0.64  0.44  0.58 0.63 0.06 0.11 0.48 0.25 
Sweden -0.57  0.43  0.47  0.56  1.73 0.10 -0.18  -0.15 0.14 0.43 
U. K.  0.60  0.30  0.47  0.32  0.33 0.38 0.37 0.30 0.47 0.29 
Source: our processing of Eurostat data. 
Note: Elasticity is defined as Employment % change / GDP % change.  
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Also at regional level - as expected, considering the many variables 
influencing labour market performance and evolution described in section 2 - the 
data reveal that the direct relationship between GDP growth and labour market 
indicator dynamics has quite limited explicative power. This is shown by the very low 
values of the R-squared associated with the estimates listed in table 11. 
 
Table 11. Bivariate regression between change of labour market indicators and GDP % growth at 
regional level (1999-2005) 
187 observations  Dependent variables 
  % ER growth  % UR growth  % LTUR growth 
  coefficient  p-values coefficient p-values coefficient p-values 
% GDP growth  0.207  0.003  -1.944  0.000  -3.103  0.000 
Constant 0.022  0.013  0.214  0.000  0.258  0.000 
Adjusted R2  0.042   0.104  0.160  
 
  The GDP coefficients are always of the expected sign and statistically 
significant. In these models, the size of the GDP coefficient is remarkable especially 
for the unemployment indicators, suggesting that a 1% growth in GDP would be 
associated with a reduction in UR of about 2% and of more than 3% in LTUR (of 
their initial levels, e.g., from 10% to 9.8% of UR). 
  Similar considerations may be made for table 12, in which the dependent 
variables are growth rates in employment and unemployment aggregates. Again, the 
GDP coefficients are all significant and their size is remarkable, since a 1% increase 
in GDP would be accompanied by a 0.6% increase in employment, and falls of 1.7% 
and 3% in unemployment and long-term unemployment, respectively. It is also 
noteworthy how the explicative power (R-squared) of this bivariate models increases 
for employment and decreases for unemployment indicators with respect to those of 
table 11.  
 
Table 12. Bivariate regression between GDP % growth and (un)employment growth (1999-2005) at 
regional level 
187 observations  Dependent variables 
  % Empl. growth   % Unempl. growth  % Long T. unempl. growth 
  coefficient p-values coefficient p-values coefficient  p-values 
% GDP growth  0.610  0.000  -1.683  0.000  -3.009  0.000 
 0.007  0.596  0.244  0.000  0.295  0.000 
Adjusted R2  0.151  0.067  0.137   
 
  In any case, the results shown in tables 11 and 12 are interesting, since they 
provide another simple view of the differences in outcomes obtained by using 
employment versus unemployment indicators. 
  Summarising, the generally low growth rate of the period considered was not 
accompanied by a worsening in labour market conditions, unlike what happened in 
the early 1980s and early 1990s. On the contrary, labour market performance was 
characterised by a general improvement, according to both employment and 
unemployment indicators.  
  This evidence, together with that of the relative importance of GDP 
dynamics on labour market performance at regional level, suggests examining 
different explicative variables, used below. 234 
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4. 4 Determinants of regional labour market performance: econometric 
analyses 
In this section, in order to examine the determinants of regional labour 
market performance, we present results from the specification of various models by 
means of econometric (cross-section and panel data) estimates
29. 
 
4. 4. 1 Database and estimation details and strategy 
As the determinants of (un)employment differences and dynamics across 
EU-15 regions are extremely difficult to examine, we preferred to estimate and 
present empirical results from many equations (with different sub-sets of explicative 
variables) by means of various econometric approaches. The set of explicative 
variables
30 may be separated into four groups: (i) development/growth and sectoral 
indicators; (ii) price variables (labour cost); (iii) institutional indicators; (iv) other 
variables. In the first group, we consider per capita GDP as an indicator of economic 
development and the sectoral composition of employment as 
structural/development variables. In some estimates, we also consider per capita 
GDP growth rates. As price variables, we use the hourly labour cost in industry and 
services. The set of institutional variables is particularly large for labour market 
institutions (EPL, fiscal wedge, degrees of centralisation, co-ordination and coverage 
of collective wage bargaining, active and passive labour market policies, weekly 
working time, spread of part-time), but it also includes an indicator of product 
market regulation. We are aware of the huge difficulties in assessing the labour 
market performance effects of institutions and institutional changes (e.g., due to the 
uncertain shape and duration of the distribution of the impact over time). In spite of 
the (partial) limitations due to the short period considered and the lack of some data, 
we also consider institutional changes over time and across regions using “weight 
variables” at regional level. Of course, the short period considered may lead to 
under- or over-estimations or to the emergence of unexpected relationships. For 
example, although in a long-run perspective it is difficult to predict a clear and stable 
relationship between employment protection legislation and labour market 
performance, in the short term a positive link between EPL and employment change 
may emerge, since in recession or stagnation phases it may be easier for firms in 
countries/regions with low EPL to fire workers in declining sectors. We are also 
aware of possible problems of direction of causality of the relationship between 
labour market performance and various institutional and policy settings, particularly 
active and passive labour market policies (which are partially endogenous variables). 
However, the structure of the dataset (mix of regional and country level data; see 
description below), the limited time-span available for many variables and the nature 
of some indicators (score variables) make it quite difficult to address this problem 
from the econometric viewpoint
31. Lastly, a fourth group of heterogeneous variables 
                                                 
29 Therefore, in this paper, we do not (econometrically) analyse the determinants of national labour 
market performance differential and dynamics. This topic is well-known to have been extensively 
analysed (both theoretically and empirically) in the economic literature. 
30 For a check-list of the variables used in studying regional unemployment rate differentials, see 
Elhorst (2003). This author also provides a very useful review of the most important empirical and 
theoretical literature on regional UR differences. 
31 Refinement of this point is one important aim of future research.  
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(including, for example, regional population density) is considered. The variables are 
listed and defined in table A2 of the Appendix. 
  Using differing equations and econometric methods does allow us to 
highlight the degree of (in)stability of the value and sign of the parameters of the 
explicative variables, at least partially. We are also aware that the relative effect of 
each explicative variable may change over time, and that the existence of “systemic 
effects” is likely: different quali-quantitative combinations of variables, through 
complex interactions, may produce additional effects on labour market 
performance
32. As regards the database, the set of regions examined in the previous 
section had to be reduced, due to lack of data referring to institutional features, and 
consists of 187 regions of EU-15 countries (excluding Ireland, Greece and 
Luxembourg) observed over a seven-year period (1999-2005). 
Using institutional variables poses other specific problems. Since they 
represent peculiar national features, they are obviously available only at country level. 
However, their impact may differ regionally, according to the structural 
characteristics of the regional systems in question. Thus, in order to capture the 
different strength of specific institutions at regional level, their value was weighted, 
where possible, with a relevant regional indicator. For example, the Employment 
Protection Legislation Index (EPL 2), levels of bargaining centralisation (CENTR), 
bargaining coordination (COORD), collective bargaining coverage (COVER) and 
trade union density (UNION) were weighted for the share of employees out of total 
employment at regional level. Expenditure in passive labour market policies in the 
percentage of GDP (PASS_POL) was corrected for the 
“unemployment/population” ratio at regional level. 
Secondly, all country-level institutional variables except trade union density 
(UNION)
33 were only available for some years/periods. For those indicators 
available for two years/periods close to 1999 and 2003, the intermediate years and 
the years 2004 and 2005 were estimated by means of linear interpolation
34. Other 
variables for which only one year/period was available around the time-span 1999-
2003 were assumed to be uniform over the five years
35. On one hand, these features 
are a limitation to empirical analysis; on the other, they reflect both country 
specificity (corrected for the regional impact of institutions) and the relative temporal 
stability of the institutional settings considered.  
  For cross-section analyses (section 4.4.2), we produced estimations for the 
first and final years of the considered period by using all explicative variables in two 
specification models (tables 14 and 15). We also carried out many other bivariate and 
nultivariate estimates, in order to study the determinants of changes in the three 
dependent variables during the period in question (section 4.4.3; tables 16 and 17). 
                                                 
32 Some researches define and highlight the possible “institutional equivalence” of various institutional 
systems (e.g., Bruno and Garofalo, 1999). In particular, it is possible that various “sets of 
institutional factors”, interacting with other variables, have similar effects on (un)employment 
performance. In addition, we cannot exclude the fact that similar “sets of institutional variables” 
have significantly different effects on labour market performance (Signorelli, 2000).  
33 This variable is available online at the OECD database for the years 1999 to 2001 (or 2002 for few 
countries). The remaining years were estimated by linear interpolation. 
34 This is the case for EPL 2, which has two available values for the late 1990s and 2003, respectively; 
for PMRI, available for 1998 and 2003. 
35 These are: collective bargaining coverage (COVER), available for 2000; and bargaining 
centralisation (CENTR) and (COORD), available for the period 1995-2000. 236 
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  Lastly, we produced panel econometric estimations (section 4.4.4; tables 18, 19, 
20) using four different specifications for each model (ER, UR, LTUR). Before starting 
panel estimation procedures, we ran a pooled Ordinary Least Square estimate in order to 
identify the most evident correlations among regressors, to prevent multicollinearity. 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) suggested excluding DIPEN from the analysis (this 
variable was used to weight various institutional features). We then performed standard 
panel data estimates by comparing fixed versus random effects estimates. The 
significance of the temporal effects indicated that they should be included in the models, 
whereas the Hausman test unequivocally indicated  the use of fixed effects models (see 
tables 18, 19, 20). This was consistent with previous panel analyses carried out at regional 
level in this field. For all three (fixed effects) models, the standard diagnostic test showed 
residual autocorrelation (Wooldridge test), heteroschedasticity (modified Wald test) and 
contemporaneous correlation (Breusch Pagan LM test). This suggested applying a Prais-
Winsten regression correlated panels corrected standard error (PCSEs) estimators. Since 
the corresponding STATA commands do not automatically provide fixed effects 
estimates, it was necessary to introduce the 186 (n-1) regional dummy variables (not 
listed in the tables for the sake of brevity). However, the changes in the significance 
levels of the estimated coefficients were negligible for the three models. 
The presence of the contemporaneous correlation of residuals (two or more 
units have correlated errors at the same time) indicated the probable existence of 
unobservable features of some regions, due to unobservable features in other ones. In 
the case of spatial data, this may reveal the typical phenomenon of spatial 
autocorrelation, which arises when the value assumed by a variable in a given place is 
correlated (positively or negatively) with the value assumed by the same variable in a 
different place or in a set of different places. This may be due essentially to: (a) 
measurement errors for observations referring to contiguous geographic units; (b) actual 
spatial interaction patterns. Spatial interaction may be highlighted descriptively (e.g., with 
the classical Moran I spatial correlation index) or considered in econometric analysis by 
means of specific techniques (starting from Anselin, 1988). In both cases, the technical 
precondition to the inclusion of spatial effects is the availability of a weights (or spatial 
lags) matrix able to express the connections between the geographic units in question. 
Depending on the nature of the phenomenon, weight may be represented in various 
ways. In our case, we considered the matrix of the inverse geographical distance between 
the capital city (or the most highly populated city) of each region. 
To assess the necessity of correcting the econometric estimates by means of 
spatial effects models, we calculated Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation index on the three 
basic labour market performance indicators, using the whole set of 203 regions available 
(see table 13 and diagram 5)
 36. 
 
Table 13. Dynamics of Moran’s spatial correlation Index in EU-15 regions (203 units) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
ER  0.424 0.419 0.410 0.407 0.424 0.456 0.414 
UR  0.324 0.315 0.335 0.334 0.383 0.459 0.512 
LTUR 0.333 0.340 0.332 0.357 0.427 0.494 0.531 
* All correlations are significant at 99% 
 
                                                 
36 The outcomes do not change if the Moran Index is calculated on the 187 regions used for panel 
regressions.  
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These results are consistent with the evidence (see, for example, Overmans 
and Puga, 2002) of employment/unemployment regional clusters in Europe and with 
the many studies examining regional spatial correlation patterns in labour market 
indicators (Niebuhr, 2003; Burridge and Gordon, 1981; Mohlo, 1995; Badinger and 
Url, 2002; Aragon et al., 2003; Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Decressin and Fatàs, 1995; 
Elhorst, 2003, and the many references quoted therein on pp. 738-9). They also show 
how ER has initially a greater positive spatial correlation with respect to UR and 
LTUR, which decreases in the last year. Conversely, the trend strongly increases for 
the unemployment indicators, especially after 2002. 
 
Diagram 5. Dynamics of Moran spatial autocorrelation Index in EU-15 regions for three basic labour 
market indicators (203 regions) 
0.300
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On these bases, we included spatial effects in the panel econometric 
estimates. As the econometric literature shows, traditional spatial autoregressive 
models may present: (a) the dependent variable correlated with its spatial lag (spatial 
LAG model); the error term affected by spatial autocorrelation (spatial ERROR 
model); or (C) both spatial LAG and ERROR correlations
37. In the first case, a 
typical omitted variable problem arises, which cannot be solved by means of OLS 
estimation (due to simultaneity/endogeneity) and must be tackled using Maximum 
Likelihood (ML), Instrumental Variables (IV) and Robust approach estimates. 
Alternative methods of estimation are also recommended in the case of spatial 
ERROR correlation (Atzeni et al., 2004). In our empirical analysis, we used the 
MATLAB spatial econometric tools to run ML estimates for fixed effects panel 
spatial LAG and spatial ERROR models (for results, see third and fourth columns of 
tables 18, 19 and 20, respectively). 
 
 
                                                 
37 In formal terms, following Atzeni et al. (2004), if W is the weight matrix, the starting point is:  
y = ρW1y + Xβ+ε   and    ε = λW2 ε + η, 
with  
η ~ N (0, O), and the diagonal elements of the O covariance matrix of errors Oij=hi(zα); 
β is a vector Kx1 of parameters associated with explicative variables X (matrix N x K); 
ρ is the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable; 
λ is the coefficient of a spatial autoregressive structure for disturbance ε. 
We obtain a spatial LAG model if λ = α = 0 and y = ρW1y + Xβ+ε. 
We obtain a spatial ERROR model if ρ = α= 0 and y = X β + (I - λ W)-1 η. 238 
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4. 4. 2 Results of cross-section analyses 
 
  Cross-section analyses produced using the first specification model
38 for the 
years 1999 and 2005 provided the following main results (table 14): (i) long-term 
unemployment negatively affects employment rates, with increasing strength in 2005; 
(ii) the level of economic development (regional per capita GDP) affects ER 
positively and both UR and LTUR negatively; (iii) higher weekly working hours 
influence ER negatively, whereas its impact is positive on UR and LTUR, but not 
always significantly ; (iv) higher population density determines lower ER and higher 
UR and LTUR, at low significance levels; (v) labour cost negatively affects 
unemployment rates, whereas its sign and significance for LTUR and ER are 
unstable; (vi) higher ALMP reduce UR and LTUR, whereas the coefficient is not 
significant for ER; (vii) conversely, passive labour policies increase ER, but also UR 
and LTUR; (viii) product market regulation increases unemployment rates and has a 
negative effect on ER; (ix) centralisation of wage bargaining has greatly changing 
effects on ER and UR, whereas a U-inverted shape relationship emerges for LTUR; 
(x) the effect of the degree of co-ordination is positive for ER and negative (but not 
significant) for unemployment rates; (xi) TAX_WEDGE is positively related to 
unemployment rates and negatively to ER in 2005; (xii) EPL, bargaining coverage 
and union density show not significant and/or very unstable results. 
 
Table 14. Econometric estimates: model 1 – institutional variable not corrected (1999 and 2003) 
 ER  UR  LTUR 
  1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 
 Coeff. P_values  Coeff.  P_values Coeff. P_values Coeff. P_values Coeff. P_values  Coeff.  P_values
LTUR -1.384 0.000  -2.530  0.000                 
CDE -0.131 0.212  0.113  0.241  -0.243 0.006  -0.226 0.000  -0.146 0.036  -0.088  0.033 
F 0.323 0.105  0.067  0.698  -0.559 0.001  -0.201 0.060  -0.386 0.003  -0.170  0.021 
GHI -0.236 0.026  0.033  0.732  -0.151 0.084  -0.200 0.001  -0.119 0.088  -0.084  0.043 
JK 0.359 0.002  0.214  0.029  -0.246 0.009  -0.152 0.012  -0.105 0.160  -0.084  0.043 
L_Q -0.331 0.008  -0.066  0.523  -0.021 0.841  -0.059 0.354  0.039 0.636  0.028  0.518 
GDP 0.250 0.001  0.221  0.000  -0.284 0.000  -0.139 0.000  -0.198 0.000  -0.071  0.002 
HOURS_corr -0.276 0.002  -0.022  0.844  0.164 0.022  -0.070 0.315  0.120 0.035  0.066  0.166 
DIPEN -0.001 0.995  -0.129  0.091  0.109 0.123  0.156 0.001  0.060 0.288  0.049  0.136 
DENS -1.654 0.000  -1.875  0.000  0.996 0.000  0.849 0.000  0.582 0.005  0.319  0.004 
LAB_COST -0.215 0.754  1.808  0.000  -2.331 0.000  -0.967 0.000  -1.055 0.020  0.129  0.285 
TAX_WEDGE 0.004 0.992  -1.518  0.000  1.067 0.001  0.428 0.000  0.576 0.018  -0.012  0.876 
ACT_POL -2.544 0.157  -1.884  0.468  -3.936 0.007  -3.627 0.024  -3.969 0.001  -2.457  0.026 
PASS_POL_corr 0.232 0.041  1.059  0.000  0.954 0.000  0.686 0.000  0.520 0.000  0.486  0.000 
PMRI -9.045 0.007  -9.487  0.044  5.694 0.039  -1.078 0.686  4.738 0.031  10.619  0.000 
EPL_2 0.090 0.982  -0.248  0.837  -6.961 0.033  0.065 0.931  -3.536 0.173  0.336  0.514 
CENTR -5.762 0.203  19.535  0.000  6.353 0.085  -8.233 0.000  9.222 0.002  2.541  0.096 
CENTR_2 0.486 0.508  -2.993  0.000  -1.680 0.005  0.889 0.006  -1.837 0.000  -0.476  0.031 
COORD 5.709 0.002  5.310  0.000  -3.176 0.041  -0.142 0.773  -1.499 0.223  -0.551  0.106 
COVER 0.119 0.097  -0.284  0.000  0.023 0.698  0.141 0.004  -0.084 0.077  -0.101  0.003 
UNION 1.834 0.711  6.731  0.102  -8.767 0.036  3.705 0.132  -2.711 0.412  6.358  0.000 
_cons 97.521 0.000  62.266  0.000  29.985 0.001  20.962 0.000  7.073 0.321  -9.932  0.051 
Adjusted  R2  0.915  0.906  0.865  0.909  0.782  0.913  
                                                 
38 In the first model, variables EPL_2, CENTR, COORD, COVER and UNION are not corrected by 
the share of employees at regional level.  
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  In the 2005 models we also examined the lagged effects of employment 
protection legislation (by simply including the EPL_2 variable for 2004 and 2003 in 
the model). These lagged variables show negative (but not significant) coefficients in 
the “ER” model and positive (but not significant) coefficients in the “UR” and 
“LTUR” models. 
  The second specification (table 15) (models with variables EPL_2, CENTR, 
COORD, COVER and UNION, corrected by share of employees on total 
employment at regional level) substantially confirms the outcomes obtained with the 
previous specification, also with regard to the EPL_2 lagged variables
39. 
 
 
Table 15. Econometric estimates: model 2 - institutional variable corrected  (1999 and 2005) 
 ER  UR  LTUR 
 1999  2005  1999  2005  1999  2005 
 Coeff.  P_values  Coeff.  P_values Coeff. P_values Coeff. P_values Coeff. P_values  Coeff.  P_values
LTUR -1.352  0.000  -2.434  0.000           
CDE -0.203  0.057  0.124  0.219  -0.274 0.004  -0.232 0.000  -0.173  0.021  -0.081  0.053 
F 0.258  0.186  0.188  0.288  -0.470 0.007  -0.202 0.054  -0.302  0.028  -0.145  0.048 
GHI -0.302  0.005  0.070  0.484  -0.169 0.075  -0.200 0.001  -0.136  0.072  -0.074  0.074 
JK 0.290  0.011  0.250  0.015  -0.254 0.012  -0.160 0.009  -0.109  0.176  -0.071  0.092 
L_Q -0.446  0.001  -0.077  0.480  -0.059 0.606  -0.066 0.305  0.001  0.987  0.034  0.447 
GDP 0.252  0.001  0.229  0.000  -0.247 0.000  -0.140 0.000  -0.169  0.001  -0.070  0.003 
HOURS_corr -0.343  0.000  -0.172  0.111  0.182 0.014  -0.055 0.391  0.112  0.057  0.035  0.439 
DIPEN -0.315  0.012  -0.170  0.099  0.489 0.000  0.140 0.021  0.313  0.000  0.103  0.015 
DENS -1.597  0.000  -1.812  0.000  0.912 0.001  0.856 0.000  0.532  0.014  0.335  0.003 
LAB_COST 0.523  0.459  1.473  0.000  -1.798 0.004  -0.907 0.000  -0.803  0.108  0.043  0.706 
TAX_WEDGE -0.278 0.461  -1.274  0.000  0.932 0.005  0.428 0.000  0.569  0.032  0.037  0.605 
ACT_POL -2.187  0.168  -2.494  0.354  -1.604 0.249  -3.464 0.030  -2.606  0.019  -2.570  0.021 
PASS_POL_corr 0.216  0.042  1.008  0.000  0.896 0.000  0.679 0.000  0.477  0.000  0.489  0.000 
PMRI -14.028 0.000  5.994  0.191  5.289 0.062  -0.080 0.975  4.002  0.077  9.494  0.000 
EPL_2_corr 9.304  0.067  -0.360  0.822  -4.499 0.318  0.348 0.716  -1.361  0.705  0.174  0.794 
CENTR_corr -16.740 0.001  14.481  0.000  3.467 0.428  -9.261 0.000  6.804  0.052  1.238  0.394 
CENTR_2_corr 2.647 0.007  -2.622  0.000  -1.415 0.093  1.178 0.001  -1.714  0.011  -0.359  0.139 
COORD_corr 5.669  0.005  6.662  0.000  -5.479 0.002  -0.322 0.558  -3.309  0.018  -0.492  0.200 
COVER_corr 0.121  0.134  -0.222  0.011  -0.031 0.662  0.136 0.008  -0.125  0.027  -0.083  0.020 
UNION_corr 8.325  0.185  5.324  0.275  -6.954 0.214  4.786 0.092  -1.554  0.727  6.405  0.001 
_cons 132.339 0.000  73.414  0.000  -6.387 0.579  20.614 0.013  -15.219 0.021  -12.837  0.026 
Adjusted  R2  0.917   0.899  0.852  0.909  0.762  0.911  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 In order to asses the possible existence of complementarity effects between labour and product 
markets regulation levels, in other estimations (not reported here, but available upon request) we 
also considered, in addition to EPL_2 and PMRI, also their interaction. The interaction variables 
reveal greatly changing results in different years, and their inclusion does not change the sign or 
significance of the coefficients of the other variables. However, in-depth analysis of 
complementarity of institutional settings may be one future development of the present research. 240 
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4. 4. 3 Results of determinants of changes in (un)employment rates 
  We estimated various models in order to examine some determinants of the 
changes in the three dependent variables in the period 1999-2005.  
  In the various specifications, we examined the changes in some institutional 
indicators as explicative variables. In the last two models we also added changes in 
labour costs. 
  The main results (statistically significant) of models 1-4, with only one 
explicative variable, are summarised as follows: (i) the effects of EPL changes are 
statistically significant only on UR and LTUR, but not in the expected direction; (ii) 
as regards changes in weekly hours, a surprising inverse relationship arises with 
changes in LTUR and UR, while not significant impacts on ER change emerge; (iii)  
growth in the tax wedge unexpectedly affect the dynamics of unemployment 
negatively (not significant effects on ER). 
  The following results (statistically significant) arise in models 5 and 6 
considering, as explicative variables, changes in the main institutional variables: (i) 
changes in ALMP have a positive relationship with changes in ER and a negative one 
with changes in UR and LTUR; (ii) the opposite relationship (with respect to ALMP) 
occurs for changes in passive labour policies; (iii) changes in the degree of product 
market regulation have a negative relationship with changes in ER and a positive one 
with changes in UR and LTUR; (iv)  the opposite relationship (with respect to 
PMRI) occurs for changes in EPL; (v) as regards changes in bargaining indicators
40, 
growth of centralisation is positively associated with ER growth and negatively with 
that of UR and LTUR.  
  The introduction of a quadratic term explores the possibility of a U-shaped 
relationship (in dynamic terms) for the degree of centralisation, which does not 
emerge as statistically significant
41; last, (vi) changes in union density have an inverse 
relationship with changes in ER and a positive and significant one with changes in 
LTUR. 
  In the last two models (7-8), we consider changes in labour costs in addition 
to the main institutional variables, with the following results: (i) the signs of the 
parameters of the institutional variables are not affected by the introduction of the 
new variable; (ii) changes in labour costs have a negative relationship with ER and a 
positive relationship with changes in UR, whereas effects on changes in LTUR are 
not statistically significant. The introduction of quadratic terms for CENTR 
highlights a possible inverted U-shaped relationship between changes in the degree 
of centralisation and changes in ER.  
                                                 
40 As explained in the data description, their level (not corrected by the share of dependent 
employment) does not change during the period considered, so that the dynamics of the corrected 
variables are only due to changes in share of employees. Of course, this variation is the same for the 
three variables, so that (in terms of variations) they are perfectly collinear, and the sign of the 
surviving one also applies to the remaining ones. 
41 In order to asses the impact of these (time-unchanging, except for the weight component) variables 
on the estimated models, we also run regressions 5 to 8 excluding them (available upon request).  
This did not change the signs and significance of the remaining variables.  
 
Cristiano Perugini and Marcello Signorelli, Labour Market Performance in EU-15 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
241
Table 16. Econometric estimates: changes between 1999 and 2005 
 187  observations  ∆ER  ∆UR  ∆LTUR 
     coeff. p-values coeff. p-values coeff. p-values 
 EPL_2  -0.045  0.144  -0.428  0.022  -0.708  0.003 
(1) _cons  0.045  0.000  -0.018  0.494  -0.112  0.001 
  Adj R-squared =  0.006    0.023    0.040   
 EPL_2_corr  0.000  0.994  -0.625  0.001  -0.944  0.000 
(2) _cons  0.046  0.000  -0.017  0.497  -0.110  0.001 
  Adj R-squared =  -0.005    0.057    0.078   
 HOURS_corr  0.040  0.581  -2.851  0.000  -2.942  0.000 
(3) _cons  0.049  0.000  -0.190  0.000  -0.285  0.000 
  Adj R-squared =  -0.004    0.218    0.135   
 TAX_WEDGE  0.004  0.913  -0.551  0.024  -0.873  0.006 
(4) _cons  0.046  0.000  0.006  0.807  -0.073  0.035 
  Adj R-squared =  -0.005    0.022    0.035   
  ACT_POL 0.146  0.000  -0.383  0.000  -0.548  0.000 
 PASS_POL_corr  -0.063  0.000  0.630  0.000  0.807  0.000 
 PMRI  -0.365  0.000  0.775  0.000  0.880  0.001 
(5) EPL_2_corr  0.169  0.000  -0.086  0.383  -0.427  0.014 
 CENTR_corr  0.609  0.000  -0.885  0.036  -2.148  0.004 
 UNION_corr  -0.425  0.000  0.209  0.156  1.166  0.000 
 _cons  -0.088  0.000  0.169  0.002  0.174  0.071 
  Adj R-squared =  0.588    0.897    0.815   
 ACT_POL  0.145  0.000  -0.386  0.000  -0.541  0.000 
 PASS_POL_corrr  -0.063  0.000  0.631  0.000  0.804  0.000 
 PMRI  -0.364  0.000  0.777  0.000  0.876  0.002 
(6) EPL_2_corr  0.170  0.000  -0.082  0.411  -0.437  0.012 
 CENTR_corr  0.718  0.000  -0.527  0.343  -2.868  0.003 
 CENTR_2_corr  -1.916  0.352  -6.256  0.321  12.564  0.253 
 UNION_corr  -0.440  0.000  0.161  0.300  1.263  0.000 
 _cons  -0.089  0.000  0.167  0.003  0.179  0.064 
  Adj R-squared =  0.587    0.897    0.815   
 ACT_POL  0.121  0.000  -0.327  0.000  -0.552  0.000 
 PASS_POL_corrr  -0.064  0.000  0.632  0.000  0.807  0.000 
 PMRI  -0.294  0.000  0.617  0.000  0.891  0.002 
 EPL_2_corr  0.214  0.000  -0.188  0.055  -0.420  0.020 
(7) CENTR_corr  0.351  0.009  -0.308  0.468  -2.188  0.005 
 UNION_corr  -0.285  0.000  -0.106  0.505  1.187  0.000 
 LAB_COST  -0.228  0.000  0.511  0.000  -0.035  0.873 
 _cons  -0.024  0.219  0.025  0.690  0.184  0.108 
  Adj R-squared =  0.657    0.906    0.814   
 ACT_POL  0.118  0.000  -0.329  0.000  -0.540  0.000 
 PASS_POL_corrr  -0.064  0.000  0.632  0.000  0.804  0.000 
 PMRI  -0.289  0.000  0.620  0.000  0.874  0.002 
 EPL_2_corr  0.220  0.000  -0.185  0.061  -0.438  0.015 
(8) CENTR_corr  0.560  0.001  -0.195  0.717  -2.865  0.004 
 CENTR_2_corr  -3.897  0.039  -2.109  0.730  12.614  0.259 
 UNION_corr  -0.307  0.000  -0.118  0.469  1.260  0.000 
 LAB_COST  -0.241  0.000  0.505  0.000  0.006  0.978 
 _cons  -0.022  0.261  0.026  0.677  0.177  0.123 
  Adj R-squared =  0.664    0.906    0.814   
  
Lastly, we provide evidence of spatial autocorrelation at the regional level of changes in 
variables across the 1999-2005 period (table 17)
42. All the changes in variables show positive 
and 99% statistically significant spatial autocorrelations, except for the employment share of 
                                                 
42 Of course, the institutional (not corrected) variables which do not vary in the period (CENTR, 
COORD and COVER) are not included, since their changes are always zero. 242 
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traditional services (GHI). The level of the coefficient is remarkable for some labour market 
variables, for which it exceeds 0.5. The higher coefficients of the institutional indicators 
obviously depend on the fact that they are measured at country level. 
Table 17. Moran I index of global spatial correlation for changes (1999-2005) of all 
variables considered (regional level) 
Variable Moran’s  I  P-value  Variable Moran’s  I  P-value 
EMP 0.254  0.000  HOURS 0.331  0.000 
ER 0.314  0.000  HOURS_corr 0.589  0.000 
UNEMPL 0.523  0.000  DENS 0.178  0.000 
UR 0.534  0.000  LAB_COST 0.624  0.000 
LONG_UNEMP 0.520 0.000  TAX_WEDGE 0.552  0.000 
LTUR 0.523  0.000  ACT_POL 0.503  0.000 
CDE 0.433  0.000  PASS_POL 1.033  0.000 
F 0.562  0.000  PASS_POL_ corr  0.712  0.000 
GHI 0.051  0.069  IRBM 0.825  0.000 
JK 0.329  0.000  EPL_2 0.715  0.000 
L_Q 0.256  0.000  EPL_2_ corr  0.669  0.000 
GDP (per capita))  0.412  0.000  CENTR_ corr  0.336  0.000 
GDP 0.418  0.000  CENTR_2_ corr  0.107  0.000 
PART_T 0.380  0.000  COORD_ corr  0.336  0.000 
FULL_T 0.519  0.000  COVER_ corr  0.336  0.000 
DIPEN 0.336  0.000  UNION 0.709  0.000 
SELF 0.236  0.000  UNION_ corr  0.652  0.000 
 
4. 4. 4 Results of panel analysis 
  The four econometric specifications (fixed effects, fixed effects correlated PCSE, fixed 
effects with spatial lags on the dependent variable, fixed effects with spatial lags on the error terms) 
for each dependent variable provide results which are almost identical in terms of coefficient signs, 
levels and significance. This suggests that the outcomes obtained may be considered reliable and that 
the explanatory variables already capture spatial interactions.  
Among the economic and structural variables presumed to influence ER (table 18), a negative 
impact is played by LTUR and population density. The latter suggests that urban regions probably attract 
labour supply and at the same time are less able to provide those “sub-optimal” employment 
opportunities usually offered in rural regions (in terms of under-employment in farming and farming-
related sectors). Instead, a positive role on ER is played by relative regional industry specialisation in 
business (JK) and public (L_Q) services. Other industry structure variables (CDE, F, and GHI), as well as 
per capita GDP levels, have no significant impacts. The number of hours worked weekly 
(HOURS_corr) is steadily negative, but significant (at 90%) only in spatial econometric specifications. 
Labour cost levels negatively affect employment rate, as expected, while the size of the 
TAX_WEDGE does not seem to have any statistically significant relationship with ER. 
Conversely, labour policy variables (ACT_POL and PASS_POL) are steadily significant, and 
positive and negative, respectively. 
As regards the set of institutional variables, the product market regulation index (PMRI) plays a 
persistent negative role, whereas the opposite occurs for EPL. The latter relationship also persists with the 
inclusion in the models of lagged (one or two years) EPL variables. Among the remaining institutional 
variables, only UNION density is steadily significant, and its higher levels are associated with worse ER 
performance. The remaining institutional variables show mainly insignificant and unstable results
43. 
                                                 
43 For this and the following models, we also ran estimates (available upon request) excluding the time-invariant indicators 
(except for the weight component), but the sign and significance of the remaining variables did not change.   
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Table 18. Econometric estimates (dependent variable: employment rate) (1999-2005) 
ER  Fixed effects 
Correlated 
PCSE (fe)* 
ML (fe) 
(spatial lag-ρ) 
ML (fe) 
(spatial error-λ) 
  Coeff.  p-values Coeff. p-values Coeff. p-values Coeff. p-values 
LTUR -0.541  0.000  -0.543  0.000  -0.469  0.000  -0.535  0.000 
CDE -0.053  0.223  -0.065  0.239  -0.027  0.475  -0.007  0.849 
F 0.016  0.786  0.008  0.923  -0.020  0.696  -0.019  0.724 
GHI -0.011  0.800  -0.020  0.720  -0.005  0.893  0.019  0.632 
JK 0.109  0.037  0.089  0.145  0.090  0.047  0.110  0.019 
L_Q 0.126  0.001  0.103  0.113  0.118  0.000  0.128  0.000 
GDP -0.046  0.548  -0.037  0.681  -0.004  0.947  0.018  0.791 
HOURS_corr -0.056  0.177  -0.071  0.312  -0.066  0.066  -0.074  0.070 
DENS -9.696  0.000  -9.565  0.000  -8.165  0.000  -7.521  0.000 
LAB_COST -0.162  0.001  -0.153  0.102  -0.132  0.001  -0.182  0.001 
TAX_WEDGE 0.044  0.128  0.029  0.643  0.010  0.699  0.027  0.431 
ACT_POL 2.501  0.000  2.262  0.007  1.689  0.000  2.975  0.000 
PASS_POL_corr -0.181  0.000  -0.160  0.013  -0.152  0.000  -0.187  0.000 
PMRI -4.805  0.000  -4.667  0.000  -3.394  0.000  -5.284  0.000 
EPL_2_corr 3.825  0.000  3.736  0.000  3.261  0.000  4.664  0.000 
CENTR_corr 21.811  0.105  23.464  0.233  7.503  0.519  -10.209  0.408 
CENTR_corr_2 -2.729  0.082  -2.790  0.169  -1.334  0.327  0.431  0.765 
COORD_corr -18.834  0.024  -17.725  0.201  -12.168  0.092  -3.757  0.613 
COVER_corr 0.098  0.681  0.029  0.932  0.182  0.377  0.264  0.211 
UNION_corr -13.838  0.008  -13.002  0.120  -14.079  0.002  -22.073  0.000 
dummy_1999 0.500  0.295  0.466  0.454  0.719  0.082  0.793  0.136 
dummy_2000 0.673  0.085  0.687  0.144  0.749  0.027  0.952  0.030 
dummy_2001 0.436  0.180  0.462  0.237  0.448  0.112  0.640  0.083 
dummy_2002 0.137  0.584  0.160  0.583  0.236  0.277  0.296  0.312 
dummy_2003 0.028  0.879  0.041  0.836  0.116  0.462  0.108  0.634 
dummy_2004 -0.382  0.003  -0.364  0.001  -0.199  0.077  -0.347  0.053 
_cons 66.993  0.000  110.136  0.000  -  -  - - 
n. of observations  1309   1309    1309    1309   
n. of groups  187   187    187    187   
F (26,1096)  67.170  0.000        
R-sq within  0.614          
R sq between  0.000          
R sq overall  0.001          
R squared  -  -  0.983  0.986  0.986  
             
Hausman Test  705.300  0.000          
Wooldridge test  91.603  0.000        
Modified Wald (heteroskedasticity)  3899.850  0.000        
Breusch-Pagan LM  
(contemp. correlation) 
25752.913  0.000 
 
      
ρ   (AR 1 term)     0.151       
ρ / λ  (spatial effects  terms)         0.359  0.000  0.440  0.000 
* Coefficients and p_values of regional fixed effects omitted for sake of brevity 
 
The second set of estimates (table 19) provides evidence of a negative impact on UR 
of CDE, GHI, JK and L_Q specialisation. Similarly, HOURS and TAX_WEDGE have a 
negative and significant coefficient. Per capita GDP is never significant at 5% (and only in 
two models at 10%). Increasing labour costs tend to raise unemployment rates, which are 
also associated with the most urban contexts (positive sign of DENS). As regards the 
variables assumed as quantitative proxies of labour policies, ACT_POL is significant only in 244 
 
EJCE, vol. 4, n. 2 (2007) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
the spatial models, whereas passive policies are steadily associated with higher UR. Growing 
product market regulation (PMRI) also “positively” influences unemployment rates
44. 
 
Table 19. Econometric estimates (dependent variable: unemployment rate) (1999-2005) 
UR  Fixed effects 
Correlated 
PCSE (fe)* 
ML (fe) 
(spatial lag-ρ) 
ML (fe) 
(spatial error-λ) 
  Coeff.  p-values Coeff. p-values Coeff. p-values Coeff. p-values 
CDE -0.112  0.000  -0.078  0.097  -0.122  0.000  -0.100  0.000 
F 0.029  0.484  0.025  0.690  0.064  0.069  0.070  0.034 
GHI -0.130  0.000  -0.096  0.032  -0.113  0.000  -0.095  0.000 
JK -0.101  0.006  -0.080  0.038  -0.074  0.017  -0.054  0.060 
L_Q -0.126  0.000  -0.102  0.008  -0.117  0.000  -0.115  0.000 
GDP -0.091  0.088  -0.091  0.273  -0.060  0.186  -0.068  0.091 
HOURS_corr -0.102  0.001  -0.071  0.147  -0.052  0.041  -0.061  0.021 
DENS 3.605  0.018  3.611  0.000  2.335  0.072  0.096  0.934 
LAB_COST 0.272  0.000  0.262  0.000  0.242  0.000  0.270  0.000 
TAX_WEDGE -0.146  0.000  -0.132  0.002  -0.093  0.000  -0.116  0.000 
ACT_POL 0.314  0.332  0.298  0.645  0.761  0.006  0.539  0.159 
PASS_POL_corr 1.005  0.000  0.984  0.000  0.884  0.000  1.014  0.000 
PMRI 2.306  0.000  2.174  0.005  1.572  0.000  2.852  0.000 
EPL_2_corr -0.067  0.864  0.003  0.997  -0.171  0.609  -0.170  0.705 
CENTR_corr -31.568  0.001  -34.298  0.005  -33.020  0.000  -29.611  0.000 
CENTR_corr_2 5.771  0.000  5.697  0.000  5.686  0.000  4.763  0.000 
COORD_corr 7.634  0.193  5.837  0.499  6.339  0.203  5.220  0.253 
COVER_corr 0.149  0.375  0.261  0.363  0.256  0.073  0.240  0.066 
UNION_corr -10.558  0.004  -10.079  0.061  -5.528  0.076  2.949  0.440 
dummy_1999 0.662  0.049  0.649  0.305  0.566  0.048  -0.133  0.741 
dummy_2000 1.026  0.000  0.972  0.076  0.965  0.000  0.319  0.353 
dummy_2001 0.632  0.006  0.575  0.222  0.787  0.000  0.136  0.646 
dummy_2002 0.341  0.054  0.306  0.377  0.406  0.007  -0.046  0.853 
dummy_2003 -0.017  0.894  -0.030  0.891  0.033  0.761  -0.307  0.140 
dummy_2004 0.081  0.372  0.063  0.566  0.072  0.354  -0.097  0.597 
_cons 29.210  0.000  12.490  0.275  -  -  -  - 
n. of observations  1309    1309  1309  1309  
n. of groups  187    187    187    187   
F (25, 1097)  161.050          
R-sq within  0.786          
R sq between  0.367          
R sq overall  0.382          
R squared      0.975  0.983  0.987  
Hausman Test  118.560  0.000        
Wooldridge test  73.381  0.000        
Modified Wald (heteroskedasticity)  49790.730  0.000        
Breusch-Pagan LM (contemp. 
correlation) 
32140.835  0.000        
ρ  (AR 1 term)     0.245       
ρ / λ (spatial effects terms)         0.325  0.000  0.687  0.000 
* Coefficients and p_values of regional fixed effects omitted for sake of brevity 
                                                 
44 If employment protection legislation (also in lagged form) and bargaining coordination levels are 
not significant, an increasing bargaining centralisation (associated with its quadratic form) reduces 
UR, with decreasing marginal effects (the significance of the U-shaped pattern reveals that a 
positive relationship emerges only after very high levels of centralisation. Lastly, the degree of 
bargaining coverage (COVER) is associated with higher UR (significant in the spatial models), 
whereas union density coefficient does not play a clear and statistically significant role.  
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  The third group of estimations (referring to LTUR; table 20) shows some 
remarkable differences with respect to the previous one. Specialisation in business 
services is the only significant variable among the industry indicators; GDP and 
HOURS_corr are not significant; population density decreases long-term 
unemployment, and stronger ACT_POL are associated with lower LTUR. The 
positive and significant relationships with PMRI and union density are also 
confirmed for LTUR; EPL is never significant. 
 
Table 20. Econometric estimates (dependent variable: long-term unemployment rate) (1999-2005) 
Long Term UR  Fixed effects 
Correlated 
PCSE (fe)* 
ML (fe) 
(spatial lag-ρ) 
ML (fe) 
(spatial error-λ) 
  Coeff. p-values  Coeff.  p-values  Coeff.  p-values  Coeff.  p-values 
CDE -0.040  0.093  -0.035  0.229  -0.032  0.105  0.001  0.977 
F -0.050  0.124  -0.048  0.152  -0.008  0.773  0.004  0.888 
GHI -0.061  0.011  -0.056  0.037  -0.040  0.045  -0.024  0.228 
JK -0.098  0.001  -0.098  0.000  -0.060  0.010  -0.033  0.154 
L_Q -0.012  0.548  -0.013  0.596  0.005  0.761  0.013  0.449 
GDP 0.013  0.756  0.007  0.851  0.015  0.669  -0.027  0.404 
HOURS_corr -0.015  0.522  -0.010  0.782  0.001  0.954  -0.022  0.300 
DENS -1.778  0.133  -1.671  0.004  -1.864  0.058  -1.516  0.096 
LAB_COST 0.113  0.000  0.111  0.004  0.104  0.000  0.133  0.000 
TAX_WEDGE -0.082  0.000  -0.079  0.002  -0.048  0.000  -0.081  0.000 
ACT_POL -0.650  0.010  -0.691  0.049  -0.084  0.691  -0.641  0.031 
PASS_POL_c~r 0.564  0.000  0.557  0.000  0.467  0.000  0.558  0.000 
PMRI 1.498  0.000  1.496  0.004  0.841  0.001  2.059  0.000 
EPL_2_corr 0.421  0.166  0.407  0.355  0.255  0.313  0.444  0.203 
CENTR_corr -29.026  0.000  -29.468  0.001  -27.001  0.000  -20.606  0.001 
CENTR_corr_2 3.601  0.000  3.595  0.000  3.387  0.000  2.581  0.000 
COORD_corr 11.168  0.014  10.809  0.065  8.183  0.030  2.844  0.430 
COVER_corr 0.050  0.703  0.072  0.610  0.122  0.258  0.106  0.303 
UNION_corr 8.608  0.002  8.553  0.046  9.559  0.000  17.708  0.000 
dummy_1999 -0.051  0.846  -0.070  0.872  -0.008  0.971  -0.665  0.033 
dummy_2000 0.410  0.055  0.382  0.299  0.397  0.025  -0.103  0.697 
dummy_2001 0.238  0.180  0.212  0.490  0.356  0.016  -0.169  0.455 
dummy_2002 -0.047  0.733  -0.065  0.775  0.080  0.487  -0.361  0.055 
dummy_2003 -0.099  0.319  -0.106  0.455  -0.041  0.624  -0.349  0.026 
dummy_2004 -0.030  0.666  -0.034  0.638  -0.012  0.837  -0.161  0.235 
_cons 21.920  0.000  36.593  0.000  -  -  -  - 
n. of observations  1309   1309    1309  1309  
n. of groups  187    187    187    187   
F (25, 1097)  100.920           
R-sq within  0.697          
R sq between  0.015          
R sq overall  0.021          
R squared     0.970   0.978    0.981   
             
Hausman Test  159.170 0.000          
Wooldridge test  50.571 0.000          
Modified Wald 
(heteroskedasticity) 
26251.370 0.000          
Breusch-Pagan LM (contemp. 
correlation) 
24259.791 0.000          
ρ  (AR 1 term)     0.084        
ρ / λ  (spatial effects terms)         0.409  0.000  0.665  0.000 
* Coefficients and p_values of regional fixed effects omitted for sake of brevity 
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5. Summary of main results    
  In this section we summarise the main results of the compared empirical 
examination of our three labour market performance indicators, distinguishing two 
levels, national and regional. 
  As regards national level (EU-15 countries), we highlight the following main 
empirical evidence for the period 1997-2006:  
(A) notwithstanding a generally low and decreasing annual GDP growth rate (EU-15 
average of +2.3% in the whole period and +1.8% over the last five years), a 
widespread and unexpected improvement in labour market performance 
occurred (over 18 million new jobs created, all employees, of which over two-
thirds with permanent contracts and half with part-time contracts; ER increased 
in all countries, and by 12.5% on average; UR and LTUR decreased in 12 out of 
15 countries, by -24.5% and  -35.4% on average, respectively);  
(B) correlation coefficients and elasticity between GDP growth and changes in 
labour market performance indicators are quite unstable over time and across 
countries, but clearly highlight the fact that the recent slowing down of growth 
rates was generally accompanied by surprising (un)employment improvements; 
(C) in the whole period considered, clear beta convergence emerges for ER, UR and 
LTUR (in ER terms, this means convergence towards the main quantitative 
objective of the European Employment Strategy); sigma convergence also 
occurred in the whole period for ER and started later for UR and LTUR (since 
2000 and 2001, respectively), the latter two showing much higher dispersion than 
the former; 
(D) in spite of the above general converging trends, remarkable national differences 
still existed in 2006 in terms of ER (58.4 of Italy vs. 77.4 of Denmark), UR (9.5 
of France vs. 3.9 of Denmark and Netherlands) and LTUR (4.7 of Germany vs. 
0.8 of Denmark); 
(E) similarly, labour market performance improvements occurred in EU-15 and 
EMU-12 aggregates; 
  As for the regional NUTS 2 level, we highlight some results of (i) 
comparative and convergence analyses and (ii) econometric examination of the 
determinants of regional labour market performance in the period 1999-2005: 
(F) median performance over the period considered is positive for ER but shows a 
U-shape for unemployment indicators; 
(G) transition matrixes highlighted a widespread lower persistence probabilities for 
UR and LTUR with respect to ER; 
H) lowess beta convergence dynamics emerged for all three indicators; sigma 
convergence occurred for ER (throughout the period) and for UR and LTUR 
(since 2001), the latter two showing much higher dispersion than the former.;  
(I) in spite of the above prevailing converging dynamics, remarkable regional 
differences still existed in 2005 in terms of ER (44.1 of Sicily, Italy vs. 78.0 of 
Berkshire, Bucks and Oxfordshire, UK), UR (22.3 of Halle, Germany vs. 2.6 of 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire, UK) and LTUR (13.7 of 
Dessau, Germany vs. 0.4 of Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire, 
UK); 
(L) bivariate regressions confirmed the limited explicative power of the relationship 
between GDP growth rates and labour market dynamics in the period 1999-
2005;  
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(M) cross-section analyses (for 1999 and 2005) provided the following main results: 
(i) long-term unemployment negatively affects employment rates, with increased 
strength in 2005; (ii) the level of economic development (per capita GDP) affects 
ER positively and both UR and LTUR negatively; (iii) higher weekly working 
hours influence ER negatively, whereas its impact is positive on UR and LTUR, 
but not always significantly ; (iv) higher population density determines lower ER 
and higher UR and LTUR, at low significance levels; (v) labour cost affects 
unemployment rates negatively, whereas its sign and significance for LTUR and 
ER are unstable; (vi) higher ALMP reduce UR and LTUR, whereas the 
coefficient is not significant for ER; (vii) conversely, passive labour policies 
increase ER, but also UR and LTUR; (viii) product market regulation increases 
unemployment rates and has a negative effect on ER; (ix) TAX_WEDGE is 
positively related to unemployment rates and negatively to ER in 2005. 
(N) Study of the determinants of ER, UR and LTUR changes (1999-2005) provides 
interesting results, although they are probably influenced by the short period 
considered and by cyclical conditions: (i) the effects of EPL changes are 
statistically significant only on UR and LTUR, but not in the expected direction; 
(ii) as regards changes in weekly hours, a surprising  inverse relationship arises 
with changes in LTUR and UR, whereas not significant impacts on ER changes 
emerge; (iii) tax wedge changes inversely affect the dynamics of unemployment.  
Moreover, the following results (statistically significant) arise in the two models in 
which changes in the main institutional indicators were used as explicative 
variables: (i) changes in ALMP have a positive relationship with changes in ER 
and a negative one with changes in UR and LTUR; (ii) the opposite occurs for 
changes in passive labour policies; (iii) changes in the degree of product market 
regulation have a negative relationship with changes in ER and a positive one 
with changes in UR and LTUR; (iv) the opposite occurs for changes in EPL; (v) 
changes in union density have an inverse relationship with changes in ER and a 
positive and significant one with changes in LTUR. In the last two models, 
considering changes in (hourly) labour cost in addition to the main institutional 
variables, we obtained the following main results: (i) the signs of the parameters 
of the institutional variables are not affected by the introduction of the new 
variable; (ii) changes in labour costs have a negative relationship with ER 
dynamics and a positive relationship with changes in UR. 
(O) The four different econometric approaches used for panel estimates provided 
almost identical results in terms of coefficient signs, levels and significance, and 
this suggests that the outcomes obtained may be considered reliable. In 
particular, the following outcomes were particularly interesting: (i) a higher 
degree of product market regulation played a clearly negative role on labour 
market performance indicators; (ii) the effects of EPL were not significant on UR 
or LTUR, but were positive on ER; (iii) passive labour policies showed a negative 
effect on ER and a positive relationship with UR and LTUR, highlighting the 
crucial importance of effective design (eligibility, duration, etc.) in order to avoid 
undesirable effects; (iv) active labour market policies played an important positive 
role in improving ER and reducing LTUR; (v) union density showed a significant 
and negative effect on ER and UR, whereas the relationship was positive with 
LTUR; (vi) the tax wedge had no significant effects on ER, but revealed an 
unexpected inverse relationship with UR and LTUR; (vii) labour costs affect ER 248 
 
EJCE, vol. 4, n. 2 (2007) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
negatively and UR and LTUR positively; (ix) the number of hours worked weekly 
(HOURS_corr) is steadily negative with ER (significant at 90% only in the spatial 
econometric specifications), but it is also negative and significant with UR; (viii) 
the negative impact on ER determined by LTUR suggests the crucial importance 
of specific active policies aimed at reducing permanent labour exclusion and 
hysteresis phenomena; (ix) population density had a negative significant effect on 
ER and LTUR, but a positive one on UR; one explanation is that urban regions 
attract more labour supply, but are less able to provide those “sub-optimal” 
employment opportunities usually offered in rural areas, whereas permanent 
exclusion from employment is less probable; (x) a positive role on ER is played 
by relative regional industry specialisation in business (JK) and public (L_Q) 
services, whereas a negative and significant impact on UR and LTUR of 
specialisation in the industry sector (CDE), traditional services (GHI), business 
(JK) and public (L_Q) services (the latter not significant for LTUR) emerged. 
Obviously, a higher share of employment in public services was related to higher 
ER and lower UR, mainly due to the particular characteristics and regional 
polarisation of this sector; (xi) lastly, it is particularly interesting that regional per 
capita GDP is never significant in explaining ER and LTUR, while a limited 
significance (with negative sign) occurred in only two UR models.  
6. Policy implications and further research 
  Lastly, this section presents some policy implications deriving from the above 
evidence and results, and suggests some directions for further research. 
  Study of the reasons for the (unexpected) improvement in labour market 
performance in EU-15 countries was beyond the scope of this paper. However, we 
can exclude (i) a “growth-led” effect
45, (ii) a “macro-economic (fiscal) policy effect”
46 
and (iii) a “single-currency effect”
47. Instead, the direct and indirect effects of the 
European Employment Strategy (launched in 1997) on national (and regional) 
employment improvements, which are extremely difficult to assess, cannot easily be 
excluded. These hypothetical positive effects had already been emphasised in a 
previous research (Perugini and Signorelli, 2004) and are reinforced by the present 
update of analysis. The EES produced some direct effects through the European 
Social Fund, but we argue that it may, especially, have produced indirect effects with 
its suggestions (guidelines) for structural labour market reforms and policy 
                                                 
45 In addition to the evidence of low and declining GDP growth, the econometric results clearly 
excluded this effect. 
46 As is well-known, generally restrictive macro-economic policies were required of many EU-15 
countries, in order to achieve the financial convergence goals defined by the Maastricht Treaty 
criteria (1992) in view of EMU membership, and (partly) confirmed in the recently reformed (2005) 
“Stability and Growth Pact” signed in 1997. 
47 The Optimal Currency Area theories mainly focus on the necessity to have a high degree of 
(geographical) labour mobility in order to avoid undesirable labour market performance effects. 
Considering the well-known low labour mobility in European countries and regions (with respect to 
the US), it should be recalled that this was one of the main reasons against the establishment of a 
monetary union in Europe; but the announced dramatic employment effects never happened, 
notwithstanding the prevailing real exchange rate appreciation of the Euro. However, we stress that 
complex migration phenomena was not considered in this paper and, obviously, they are (partly) 
different across EU-15 regions and countries, and change over time, with various effects on labour 
market performance and dynamics.  
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interventions addressed to national (and regional) governments
48. In particular, these 
labour reforms and policies probably favoured a partial emersion of “irregular 
employment”, especially in countries with a higher weight of shadow economy
49. 
  As for the regional level of investigation, in general terms the econometric 
analyses emphasise some difficulties in obtaining clearcut, stable results on the 
determinants of regional labour market differentials and dynamics, according to: (i) 
the specification model and estimate technique adopted, and (ii) the employment or 
unemployment indicator used. Obviously, the main characteristics of the causal links 
arising from these empirical analyses (sign and intensity, but especially the 
“robustness” of the results) also contribute to defining the degree of uncertainty 
about the probable impact of various economic policies and institutional reforms, 
which is one of the crucial factors to be considered (ex-ante) by policy-makers. 
Therefore, we argue that our approach may favour the initial selection and ranking of 
the most important variables which (partly) explain the differences and dynamics in 
regional (un)employment indicators. In particular, moving from the evidence that 
development/growth variables cannot significantly contribute towards explaining the 
huge differences and recent dynamics in regional labour market performance, and 
considering the unclear effects of sector specialisation (with some exceptions), the 
role of a few institutional factors (especially product market regulation
50 and active 
labour market policies
51) and labour costs emerged, with clear and quite stable effects 
on performance indicators. This evidence especially addresses: (i) wider diffusion of 
ALMP best practices and more effective implementation of passive policies; (ii) the 
definition of structural policies aimed at reducing the degree of product market 
regulation. In addition, many results highlight an inverse relationship between labour 
                                                 
48 The EES is well-known as a "dynamic" open method of co-ordination of European (national and 
regional) employment policies, based on guidelines periodically addressed to member states 
according to their specific labour market performance dynamics and institutional characteristics and 
changes. According to the European Employment Guidelines, each country annually presents a 
National Reform Programme and an Employment Report focusing on implemented policies and on 
labour market performance changes. We recall here only three features of the EES: (i) it devotes 
attention to the process of exchange of information between member states, allowing better 
assessment of the transferability of good practices, (ii) it attributes a key role to active labour market 
policies and (iii) since 2000, it has provided a better definition of clearer quantitative ER objectives, 
with greater emphasis on net employment creation rather than unemployment reduction and, in 
addition, it has been integrated in the more general "Lisbon Strategy" (launched in 2000 and 
reformed in 2005). In 2005 the European Commission decided that the Employment Guidelines 
and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines should be fully reviewed only every three years. 
Recently, in its "Green Paper" and Communication (November 22, 2006 and June 27, 2007, 
respectively) the European Commission (i) launched a broad open public debate for favouring a 
better definition of the so-called "flexicurity" approach and (ii) proposed the establishment of 
common principles of flexicurity to promote more and better jobs by combining flexibility and 
security for workers and companies.  
49 If this is the case, the stagnation of labour productivity may be partly explained by the fact that 
“emerged” employment has, at least initially, a productivity level below the average of regular 
employment.  
50 The degree of product market regulation is defined by considering (i) state control of business 
enterprises, (ii) legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship and (iii) barriers to international 
trade and investment. 
51 The set of active labour market policies is quite large and include the support to (i) private and 
public job matching services, (ii) training programmes (personalised for unemployed and/or 
addressed to specific groups of disadvantaged people). 250 
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costs and labour market performance, suggesting the importance of industrial 
relations systems favouring “wage moderation”
52.  
  Although positive net job creation is one of the key instruments favouring 
social inclusion
53, it is necessary to recall that this paper aimed at examining labour 
market performance differentials and dynamics in quantitative and stock terms
54. 
Further analyses of (i) both quantitative and qualitative performance indicators (i.e., 
more and better jobs, but also higher productivity and wages, etc.) and (ii) using a 
stock-flow approach (i.e., also considering flows “in and out” of the different 
statuses of persons employed, unemployed, out of the labour force, employed in 
temporary contracts, permanently employed, etc.) would be very useful. On the first 
point, Marelli’s paper (in this issue) emphasises how one key challenge for EU 
countries and regions is the spread of “virtuous models” of growth, characterised by 
significant increases in employment and even larger productivity gains
55. This would 
be the best “landing” after a long period (from 1970s to the mid-1990s) of prevailing 
“intensive models” of growth in EU-15 (with significant productivity gains and low 
or negative net job creation), recently followed by the spread of “extensive models” 
of growth (with significant improvements in employment, but generally low GDP 
and productivity growth rates)
56. On the second point, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) 
highlight a “transitional honeymoon effect” on net job creation produced by labour 
                                                 
52 It is not simple to properly define "wage moderation", but it depends crucially on a better link 
between wages (labour costs) and productivity - both levels and dynamics - across regions, firms 
and workers, and over time.  
53 Higher ER (and lower UR and LTUR) favours socially sustainable economic development. We 
recall the important effect (through the "fiscal wedge") of a higher ER for the dynamic sustainability 
of the European "welfare state systems". 
54 In other words, the aim of the paper is to shed light on the evidence of countries and especially 
regions with comparatively more and/or increasing jobs (opportunities) and less and/or decreasing 
(long-term) unemployment. 
55 Productivity gains may allow sustainable increases in real wages which, affecting consumers’ 
expenditure, can further reinforce "virtuous models". 
56 Whereas the European Employment Strategy may be "suspected" of positive direct and indirect 
effects on (national and regional) labour market performance dynamics, the Lisbon Strategy was 
certainly not followed by the declared gains in compared competitiveness and growth, mainly as a 
consequence of very limited implementation (see, e.g., Perugini and Signorelli, 2005b). The 
European Commission and European Central Bank recommendations mainly focus on levels and 
dynamics of national public finance balances (deficit and debt with respect to GDP), whereas 
attention paid to the levels and compositions of the EU budget (around 1% of EU GDP, with a still 
high - over 40% - weight of expenditure for the agricultural sector) and national budgets (with a 
public expenditure of around 50% of the GDP and a marginal weight of public investments) is 
generally insufficient. We argue that significant modifications to the compositions of national (and 
sub-national) budgets, together with a gradual reduction of their levels with respect to GDP, are of 
crucial importance in favouring the spread of "virtuous models" of growth and may be partly 
favoured by better implementation of the reformed "Stability and Growth Pact". As for the EU 
budget, an increase of incidence with respect to GDP would be desirable but not realistic in the 
short-medium term, whereas there are still significant margins for further improvements in the 
effective allocation of EU resources. However, the declared key objective of "more growth and jobs 
for all EU regions and cities" adopted for the new Structural Funds (2007-2013) is consistent with 
the European "Growth and Jobs Agenda" launched in 2005. Obviously, it is absolutely necessary to 
avoid the EU falling headlong into the worst of the possible "models of growth" characterised by 
low or negative dynamics in both employment and productivity (and GDP). Many theoretical and 
empirical researches clearly attributed to the quantity and/or quality of (public and private) 
investment in human capital (basic and academic education, on the job training, life-long learning, 
etc.) a key role for favouring better GDP growth rates and higher productivity gains.  
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market reforms increasing flexibility “at the margin”, but it would be useful: (i) to 
explain why, in some countries, the honeymoon is lasting so long, and (ii) to better 
define the conditions for improving further the “bridge function towards permanent 
jobs” played by temporary and training contracts. 
  Lastly, at least the following two further research developments of this paper 
are of particular interest
57: (i) examination of possible interactions between various 
institutional variables, in order to detect “systemic effects” and possible situations of 
“institutional equivalence”, i.e., different institutional “baskets” allowing similar high 
degrees of performance; (ii) joint and integrated analysis of the determinants of both 
national and regional labour market performance differentials and dynamics. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Female Employment rate (ER) levels and dynamics (EES objective: more than 60% by 2010) 
∆ 1997-20061    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
p. p.  % 
EU-15  50.8 51.6 53.0 54.1 55.0 55.6 56.0 56.8 57.4 58.4 +7.6 +15.0 
EMU-12  47.7 48.6 50.1 51.4 52.4 53.1 53.6 54.5 55.2 56.4 +8.7 +18.2 
Belgium  46.5 47.6 50.4 51.5 51.0 51.4 51.8 52.6 53.8 54.0 +7.5 +16.1 
Denmark  69.1 70.2 71.1 71.6 72.0 71.7 70.5 71.6 71.9 73.4 +4.3  +6.2 
Germany  55.3 55.8 57.4 58.1 58.7 58.9 58.9 59.2 59.6 61.5 +6.2 +11.2 
Ireland  45.9 49.0 52.0 53.9 54.9 55.4 55.7 56.5 58.3 59.3 +13.4 +29.2 
Greece  39.3 40.5 41.0 41.7 41.5 42.9 44.3 45.2 46.1 47.4 +8.1 +20.6 
Spain  34.6 35.8 38.5 41.3 43.1 44.4 46.3 48.3 51.2 53.2 +18.6 +53.8 
France  52.4 53.1 54.0 55.2 56.0 56.7 57.3 57.4 57.6 57.7 +5.3 +10.1 
Italy  36.4 37.3 38.3 39.6 41.1 42.0 42.7 45.2 45.3 46.3 +9.9 +27.2 
Luxembourg  45.3 46.2 48.6 50.1 50.9 51.6 50.9 51.9 53.7 54.6 +9.3 +20.5 
Netherlands  58.0 60.1 62.3 63.5 65.2 66.2 66.0 65.8 66.4 67.7 +9.7 +16.7 
Austria  58.6 58.8 59.6 59.6 60.7 61.3 61.6 60.7 62.0 63.5 +4.9  +8.4 
Portugal  56.5 58.2 59.4 60.5 61.3 61.4 61.4 61.7 61.7 62.0 +5.5  +9.7 
Finland  60.3 61.2 63.4 64.2 65.4 66.2 65.7 65.6 66.5 67.3 +7.0 +11.6 
Sweden  67.2 67.9 69.4 70.9 72.3 72.2 71.5 70.5 70.4 70.7 +3.5  +5.2 
U.  K.  63.1 63.6 64.2 64.7 65.0 65.2 65.3 65.6 65.9 65.8 +2.7  +4.3 
Coeff. of var.  0,206 0,199 0,190 0,180 0,178 0,170 0,159 0,146 0,138 0,135     
U.  S.  67.1 67.4 67.6 67.8 67.1 66.1 65.7 65.4 65.6 n.a. -1.5 -2.2 
Japan  57.6 57.2 56.7 56.7 57.0 56.5 56.8 57.4 58.1 n.a. +0.5 +0.9 
Source: Eurostat        
Note: (1) ∆ 1997-2005 for U.S. and Japan. 
 
 
Table A2. 55-64 Employment rate (ER) levels and dynamics (EES objective: more than 50% by 2010) 
∆ 1997-20061    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
p. p.  % 
EU-15  36.4 36.6 37.1 37.8 38.8 40.2 41.7 42.5 44.1 45.3 +8.9 +24.5 
EMU-12  33.5 33.5 33.9 34.4 35.2 36.5 37.9 38.6 40.4 41.7 +8.2 +24.5 
Belgium  22.1 22.9 24.6 26.3 25.1 26.6 28.1 30.0 31.8 32.0 +9.9 +44.8 
Denmark  51.7 52.0 54.5 55.7 58.0 57.9 60.2 60.3 59.5 60.7 +9.0 +17.4 
Germany  38.1 37.7 37.8 37.6 37.9 38.9 39.9 41.8 45.4 48.4 +10.3 +27.0 
Ireland  40.4 41.7 43.7 45.3 46.8 48.0 49.0 49.5 51.6 53.1 +12.7 +31.4 
Greece  41.0 39.0 39.3 39.0 38.2 39.2 41.3 39.4 41.6 42.3 +1.3  +3.2 
Spain  34.1 35.1 35.0 37.0 39.2 39.6 40.7 41.3 43.1 44.1 +10.0 +29.3 
France  29.0 28.3 28.8 29.9 31.9 34.7 36.8 37.3 37.9 37.6 +8.6 +29.7 
Italy  27.9 27.7 27.6 27.7 28.0 28.9 30.3 30.5 31.4 32.5 +4.6 +16.5 
Luxembourg  23.9 25.1 26.4 26.7 25.6 28.1 30.3 30.4 31.7 33.2 +9.3 +38.9 
Netherlands  32.0 33.9 36.4 38.2 39.6 42.3 44.3 45.2 46.1 47.7 +15.7 +49.1 
Austria  28.3 28.4 29.7 28.8 28.9 29.1 30.3 28.8 31.8 35.5 +7.2 +25.4 
Portugal  48.5 49.6 50.1 50.7 50.2 51.4 51.6 50.3 50.5 50.1 +1.6  +3.3 
Finland  35.6 36.2 39.0 41.6 45.7 47.8 49.6 50.9 52.7 54.5 +18.9 +53.1 
Sweden  62.6 63.0 63.9 64.9 66.7 68.0 68.6 69.1 69.4 69.6 +7.0 +11.2 
U.  K.  48.3 49.0 49.6 50.7 52.2 53.4 55.4 56.2 56.9 57.4 +9.1 +18.8 
Coeff. of var.  0.302  0.299  0.292  0.290 0.301 0.287 0.274 0.274 0.253 0.243     
U.  S.  57.2 57.7 57.7 57.8 58.6 59.5 59.9 59.9 60.8 n.a. +3.6 +6.3 
Japan  64.2 63.8 63.4 62.8 62.0 61.6 62.1 63.0 63.9 n.a. -0.3 -0.5 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: (1) ∆ 1997-2005 for U.S. and Japan. 
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Figure A1. Employment rate (ER) and the size of shadow economy (2000) 
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Source: elaboration on Eurostat data (ER) and Schneider (2003) calculations based on “currency demand 
approach” (shadow economy). 
Note: Data not available for Luxemburg. 
 
 
Figure A2. Employment rate (ER) and part time ER (2006) 
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Source: elaboration on Eurostat data  
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Figure A3. Employment rate (ER) and employees ER (2006) 
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Source: elaboration on Eurostat data 
 
 
Figure A4. Employment rate (ER, 2006) and temporary ER (2006) 
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Source: elaboration on Eurostat data 
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Figure A5. Employment rate (ER, 2003) and EPL-2 (2003) 
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Source: elaboration on Eurostat data and OECD (2004) for EPL-2. 
Note: Data not available for Luxemburg. 
 
 
Figure A6. Employment rate (ER, 2005) and fiscal wedge (2005)  
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Table A3. NUTS 2 regions considered in empirical analysis 
 
  GERMANY     UNITED KINGDOM
de11  Stuttgart  de92  Hannover  ukc1  Tees Valley and Durham  uki2  Outer London 
de12 Karlsruhe  de93 Lüneburg ukc2 Northumberland, Tyne and Wear ukj1B e r k s h i r e , Bucks and Oxfordshire 
de13  Freiburg  de94  Weser-Ems  ukd1  Cumbria  ukj2  Surrey, East and West Sussex 
de14  Tübingen  dea1  Düsseldorf  ukd2  Cheshire  ukj3  Hampshire and Isle of Wight 
de21 Oberbayern  dea2  Köln  ukd3  Greater  Manchester  ukj4  Kent 
de22  Niederbayern  dea3  Münster  ukd4  Lancashire  ukk1  Glouc, Wilt. and North Somerset 
de23  Oberpfalz  dea4  Detmold  ukd5  Merseyside  ukk2  Dorset and Somerset 
de24  Oberfranken  dea5  Arnsberg  uke1  East Riding and North Lincolns.  ukk3  Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 
de25 Mittelfranken  deb1  Koblenz  uke2  North  Yorkshire  ukk4  Devon 
de26  Unterfranken  deb2  Trier  uke3  South Yorkshire  ukl1  West Wales and The Valleys 
de27  Schwaben  deb3  Rheinhessen-Pfalz  uke4  West Yorkshire  ukl2  East Wales 
de30 Berlin  dec0  Saarland  ukf1  Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire  ukm1  North Eastern Scotland 
de41  Brand. - Nordost  ded1  Chemnitz  ukf2  Leic., Rutland and Northants  ukm2  Eastern Scotland 
de42  Brand. - Südwest  ded2  Dresden  ukf3  Lincolnshire ukm3  South Western Scotland 
de50  Bremen  ded3  Leipzig  ukg1  Hereford., Worc. and Warks  ukm4  Highlands and Islands 
de60 Hamburg  dee1  Dessau  ukg2  Shropshire  and Staffordshire  ukn0  Northern  Ireland 
de71 Darmstadt  dee2  Halle  ukg3  West  Midlands     
de72 Gießen  dee3  Magdeburg  ukh1  East  Anglia     
de73 Kassel  def0  Schleswig-Holstein  ukh2  Bedfordshire,  Hertfordshire     
de80 Mecklenburg-Vorp.  deg0  Thüringen  ukh3  Essex     
de91  Braunschweig    uki1  Inner  London    
 
  BELGIUM   FRANCE   ITALY   SWEDEN   AUSTRIA 
be10  Brussels  fr10  Île de France  itc1  Piemonte se01 Stockholm  at11  Burgenland 
be21 Prov.  Antwerpen  fr21 Champagne-Ardenne  itc2  Valle d'Aosta  se02 Östra Mellansverige  at12  Niederösterreich 
be22 Prov.  Limburg  (B)  fr22 Picardie  itc3 Liguria  se04 Sydsverige  at13 Wien 
be23  Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen  fr23  Haute-Normandie  itc4  Lombardia  se06 Norra Mellansverige at21  Kärnten 
be24  Prov. Vlaams Brabant  fr24  Centre  itd1 Pr. Aut. Bolzano  se07 Mellersta Norrland  at22  Steiermark 
be25 Prov.  West-Vlaanderen fr25 Basse-Normandie  itd2 Prov. Aut. Trento  se08 Övre Norrland  at31  Oberösterreich 
be31  Prov. Brabant Wallon  fr26  Bourgogne  itd3 Veneto se09 Småland  med  öarna  at32  Salzburg 
be32  Prov. Hainaut  fr30  Nord - Pas-de-Calais  itd4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia se0a  Västsverige  at33  Tirol 
be33 Prov.  Liège  fr41 Lorraine  itd5 Emilia-Romagna    GREECE*  at34 Vorarlberg 
be34  Prov. Luxembourg (B)  fr42  Alsace  ite1  Toscana  gr11 Anat. Maked. Thraki   FINLAND 
be35 Prov.  Namur  fr43 Franche-Comté  ite2  Umbria gr12 Kentriki  Makedonia  fi13  Itä-Suomi 
  SPAIN  fr51  Pays de la Loire  ite3  Marche  gr13 Dytiki Makedonia  fi18  Etelä-Suomi 
es11 Galicia  fr52 Bretagne  ite4 Lazio  gr14 Thessalia  fi19  Länsi-Suomi 
es12  Principado de Asturias  fr53  Poitou-Charentes itf1  Abruzzo  gr21 Ipeiros  fi1a  Pohjois-Suomi 
es13 Cantabria  fr61 Aquitaine  itf2  Molise  gr22 Ionia  Nisia    NETHERLANDS
es21  Pais Vasco  fr62  Midi-Pyrénées  itf3  Campania  gr23 Dytiki Ellada  nl11  Groningen 
es22  Com. Foral de Navarra  fr63  Limousin  itf4  Puglia  gr24 Sterea Ellada  nl12  Friesland 
es23 La  Rioja  fr71 Rhône-Alpes  itf5  Basilicata gr25 Peloponnisos  nl13  Drenthe 
es24 Aragón  fr72 Auvergne  itf6  Calabria gr30 Attiki  nl21  Overijssel 
es30  Comunidad de Madrid  fr81  Languedoc-Roussillon  itg1  Sicilia  gr41 Voreio Aigaio  nl22  Gelderland 
es41  Castilla y León  fr82  Prov.-Alpes-Côte d'Azur  itg2 Sardegna  gr42 Notio  Aigaio  nl23 Flevoland 
es42 Castilla-la  Mancha  fr83 Corse    LUXEMBOURG * gr43 Kriti nl31  Utrecht 
es43 Extremadura    PORTUGAL lu00 Luxembourg    DENMARK nl32  Noord-Holland 
es51 Cataluña  pt11 Norte      dk00 Denmark  nl33 Zuid-Holland 
es52 Comunidad  Valenciana pt15 Algarve        IRELAND*  nl34 Zeeland 
es53  Illes Balears  pt16  Centro (PT)      ie01  Border, Midl. West.  nl41  Noord-Brabant 
es61 Andalucia  pt17 Lisboa      ie02 South. and Eastern  nl42  Limburg (NL) 
es62  Región de Murcia  pt18  Alentejo             
 
* The regions of these countries were excluded in the analysis of section 4.3 and 4.4 
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Table A4. Variables used in descriptive and econometric analysis 
Variable  Description  Source 
ER  Employment rate (Employed / population aged 15-64)  Eurostat Regio 
UR  Unemployment Rate (Unemployed / Labour Force)  Eurostat Regio 
LTUR  Long Term Unemployment Rate (Long-term unemployed - 12 
months and more/Labour Force)  Eurostat Regio 
CDE  % of total employment in Industry sector (excluding 
construction)  Eurostat Regio 
F  % of total employment in Construction sector   Eurostat Regio 
GHI 
% of total employment in traditional services (Wholesale and 
retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, and personal 
and household goods; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage 
and communication) 
Eurostat Regio 
JK  % of total employment in Financial intermediation; real estate, 
renting and business activities  Eurostat Regio 
L_Q 
% of total employment in Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security; education; health and social work; 
other community, social and personal service activities; private 
households with employed persons; extra-territorial 
organisations and bodies 
Eurostat Regio 
GDP  Per capita Gross Domestic Product in Purchasing Power Parity  Eurostat Regio 
PART_TIME  Share of part-time workers on total employment  Eurostat Regio 
HOURS_corr α  Average number of usual weekly hours of work in main job 
(full-time).  Eurostat Regio 
DIPEN  Share of employees on total employment  Eurostat Regio 
DENS Population  density  Eurostat Regio 
LAB_COST β  Hourly labour costs, Industry and services (excluding public 
administration), Purchasing Power Parity  Eurostat 
TAX_WEDGE β  Tax wedge on labour cost: relative tax burden for an employed 
person with low earnings  Eurostat 
ACT_POL β  Expenditure in Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) 
(categories 2-7) in % of GDP  Eurostat 
PASS_POL_corr γ  Expenditure in Passive Labour Market Policies (PLMP) 
(categories 8-9) in % of GDP  Eurostat 
PMRI β  Product Market Regulation Index (0-6, from last to most 
restrictive) 
Oecd, Economic and 
Policy Reforms: going for 
growth  2005b 
EPL_2 β 
EPL_2_corr δ  Overall Employment Protection Legislation Index (Version 2)  Oecd Employment 
Outlook 2004 
CENTR β 
CENTR_corr δ  Level of Bargaining Centralisation (range: 1-5)  Oecd Employment 
Outlook 2004 
COORD β 
COORD_corr δ  Level of Bargaining Coordination (range: 1-5)  Oecd Employment 
Outlook 2004 
COVER β 
COVER_corr δ  Collective Bargaining Coverage  Oecd Employment 
Outlook 2004 
UNION β 
UNION_corr δ  Trade Union Density  Oecd on line database 
α  Variable at regional level weighted for the regional share of full time workers on total employment 
β  Variable at national level assumed uniform for all corresponding regions 
γ  Variable at national level weighted for unemployment/population ratio at regional level 
δ  Variable at national level weighted for the regional share of employees on total employment 
 